The role of economics and the quality of antitrust enforcement: an empirical analysis of the CMA/OFT antitrust cases and comparison with DGCOMP

Abstract Economists have long been arguing about the importance of economic analysis in competition law case assessment to ensure high-quality enforcement. In this article, we empirically investigate the role of economic analysis and evidence used by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in reaching antitrust infringement decisions, from 2000 to 2020. We construct indicators that measure the extent to which economic analysis is utilized and its deviation from the optimal (error-minimizing) level, aiming to understand its role in CMA’s decision-making process. We also compare findings across different conduct categories and overall, between CMA and DGCOMP (Directorate-General for Competition). CMA’s enforcement record exceeds in quality that of DGCOMP (and other EU and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) authorities), in terms of relying on an economic approach in assessing conduct types that cannot, according to economic theory, be presumed to be either harmful or benign without detailed case—specific economic assessment.