An evaluation of Borda count variations using ranked choice voting data

Abstract The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We investigate alternative ranked choice voting systems using variations of the points-based Borda count which avoid monotonicity paradoxes. These variations are based on the way partial ballots are counted and on extending the values of the points assigned to each rank in the ballot. In particular, we demonstrate which voting failures are possible for each variation and then empirically study 421 U.S. ranked choice elections conducted from 2004 to 2023 to determine the frequency of voting failures when using five Borda variations. Our analysis demonstrates that the primary vulnerability of majority failures is rare or nonexistent depending on the variation. Other voting failures such as truncation or compromise failures occur more frequently compared to instant runoff voting as a trade-off for avoiding monotonicity paradoxes.

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Publication Details

Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Published
2025-11-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01638-2
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
6.26

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article

An evaluation of Borda count variations using ranked choice voting data

N. Bradley Fox, Benjamin Bruyns
2 citations
Social Choice and Welfare
Game Theory and Voting Systems
6.26
article

An evaluation of Borda count variations using ranked choice voting data

N. Bradley Fox, Benjamin Bruyns
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Abstract The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We investigate alternative ranked choice voting systems using variations of the points-based Borda count which avoid monotonicity paradoxes. These variations are based on the way partial ballots are counted and on extending the values of the points assigned to each rank in the ballot. In particular, we demonstrate which voting failures are possible for each variation and then empirically study 421 U.S. ranked choice elections conducted from 2004 to 2023 to determine the frequency of voting failures when using five Borda variations. Our analysis demonstrates that the primary vulnerability of majority failures is rare or nonexistent depending on the variation. Other voting failures such as truncation or compromise failures occur more frequently compared to instant runoff voting as a trade-off for avoiding monotonicity paradoxes.

Social Choice and Welfare
Austin Peay State University (US)
Austin Peay State University
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
6.26
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An evaluation of Borda count variations using ranked choice voting data — N. Bradley Fox, Benjamin Bruyns · Social Choice and Welfare (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS