Religious Belief as Hinge Proposition
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein introduces the metaphor of “hinge propositions” to refer to those propositions that must remain certain if a language is to be used meaningfully within a community, such as “the earth has existed long before my birth” or “here is one hand”. This paper argues that religious belief can be understood as a distinctive form of hinge proposition for two reasons. First, if two individuals disagree on hinge propositions, they can be seen as belonging to different forms of life or language. It is impossible for them to understand each other. This is also true with disputes over religious beliefs. Second, for Wittgenstein, religious belief is not a theoretical assertion but a way of living, and therefore disputes over religious beliefs are deeper than any other dispute in ordinary life.
Authors
- Shuo Liu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3546-4070)
- Wei Lou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6538-2407)
Institutions
- Zhejiang University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Religions
- Published
- 2025-11-07
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16111427
- Primary Topic
- Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00