The mark of the dispositional: Broad, Ramsey and Wittgenstein

Abstract This paper reconstructs a trajectory of theoretical influence on the concept of disposition among C.D. Broad, F.P. Ramsey and L. Wittgenstein. The central thesis is that the form of dispositionalism Wittgenstein criticizes in his post‐Tractarian philosophy—particularly in relation to belief, meaning and understanding—corresponds closely to the conception found in Broad's The Mind and Its Place in Nature , and Ramsey's On Truth . The argument unfolds in two parts: the first outlines the methodological framework and reconstructs the Cambridge philosophical context shared by the three thinkers; the second analyses their accounts of dispositions, distinguishing between a logical‐grammatical approach and a metaphysical reification Wittgenstein aims to avoid. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein's critique responds to a specific intellectual climate, demonstrating his engagement with contemporaneous debates and offering insights still relevant to current discussions on human behaviour, against reductive and behaviouristic accounts of human capacities and tendencies.