The (ab)use of spyware in security service practice: Methodological guidelines for media reporting analyses

Recent generations of spyware, such as Pegasus and Predator, enable covert access to mobile phone content, interception of communications, and remote activation of device functions (e.g., microphone or camera) without the user's knowledge. While these tools are presented as instruments for safeguarding national security, they may also be used by security services and non-state actors against political dissenters, journalists, lawyers, activists, political opponents, and business competitors. Media coverage of such practices plays a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of the relationship between the state, security agencies, and citizens. Reports vary considerably: some accuse security services of unlawful electronic surveillance and abuse of political power; others justify the practice on the grounds of national security; while certain outlets remain silent. Consequently, the media can function either as a critical whistleblower, drawing attention to potential irregularities, or as a source of misinformation that undermines public trust and damages the reputation of both state institutions and security services. The aim of this study is to examine media reporting on spyware-enabled mobile phone surveillance in the period after 2015, focusing on cases in Hungary, Poland, North Macedonia, Greece, Israel, and Mexico, where these controversies received significant public and media attention. Furthermore, this study outlines methodological guidelines for applying content analysis in research on media reports concerning spyware and surveillance practices.