Policy Synergy for Conflicting Interests in Low-Carbon Innovation: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dynamic Incentives and Risk-Sharing in China’s Urban Renewal

Amidst the challenges posed by global climate change and China’s dual-carbon objectives, the advancement of low-carbon innovative development within urban renewal projects faces obstacles arising from the divergent interests of multiple stakeholders. This research identifies the government, social capital entities, and design research institutes as principal stakeholders and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating sixteen critical variables. The findings indicate that governmental incentive policies facilitate the system’s progression toward a stable equilibrium. Notably, when the intensity of incentives surpasses a specific threshold, a positive feedback mechanism emerges between social capital engagement and design quality. Consequently, the study proposes a collaborative framework characterized by “dynamic incentives, risk sharing, and mutual recognition of standards,” which underscores the co-evolutionary dynamics among system design, technological innovation, and market participation. This framework offers a novel approach to addressing prevalent challenges in urban renewal, including inadequate incentives, elevated risks, and low efficiency in outcome conversion.