Cross-regional and cross-level governance of food safety risk: a study based on China’s inter-governmental cooperation mechanism

Governments may lack the willingness to cooperate in managing food safety risks due to conflicts of interest. Therefore, establishing cross-regional and cross-level cooperation mechanisms—both horizontal and vertical—is crucial for mitigating these risks. This study, set in the Chinese context, develops an evolutionary game model to analyze horizontal and vertical cross-boundary governance involving two geographically proximate and homogeneous local governments, as well as the central government. Through numerical simulations, we examine the evolution of behavioral strategies, the conditions for system equilibrium, and the factors influencing both horizontal cooperation between local governments and vertical cooperation between local and central governments. Our results indicate that the risk spillover effect correlates with the physical distance between regions, with closer regions exhibiting less stable horizontal cross-boundary cooperation and facing higher food safety risks. Additionally, the costs associated with effective governance and supervision significantly impact both horizontal and vertical cooperation. Greater public participation strengthens inter-governmental cross-boundary cooperation, while vertical intervention by the central government further encourages such collaboration. Moreover, moderate economic penalties can incentivize local governments to transition from lax governance strategies to more effective ones.