Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision

With the advent of the digital age, platform ecosystems have emerged as a crucial organizational form. Focusing on innovation-oriented platforms where collaborative innovation is paramount, this study developed a two-stage principal–agent model to examine how a platform enterprise’s value preference parameter governs collaborative outcomes. Our framework demonstrates that this parameter systematically regulates the endogenous portfolio of incentives and supervision, determining governance effectiveness and value co-creation outcomes in platform ecosystems. Further analysis revealed that as the platform enterprise deepens its understanding of an embedded enterprise’s capabilities, its governance mode spontaneously transitions from supervision-intensive to incentive-intensive, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of value creation. These findings provide a principled basis for designing dynamic governance mechanisms and advance the platform governance literature by establishing the central role of the platform enterprise’s value preference parameter in coordinating endogenous governance instruments.

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Publication Details

Journal
Symmetry
Published
2025-11-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym17111884
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.23
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article

Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision

Dong Wang, Ming Lei, Xiaoming Wang, J. Albert Cao
1 citations
Symmetry
Digital Platforms and Economics
2.23
article

Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Co-Creation of Value in Innovation-Oriented Platform Ecosystem Considering Supervision

Dong Wang, Ming Lei, Xiaoming Wang, J. Albert Cao
article en
1 citations

Abstract

With the advent of the digital age, platform ecosystems have emerged as a crucial organizational form. Focusing on innovation-oriented platforms where collaborative innovation is paramount, this study developed a two-stage principal–agent model to examine how a platform enterprise’s value preference parameter governs collaborative outcomes. Our framework demonstrates that this parameter systematically regulates the endogenous portfolio of incentives and supervision, determining governance effectiveness and value co-creation outcomes in platform ecosystems. Further analysis revealed that as the platform enterprise deepens its understanding of an embedded enterprise’s capabilities, its governance mode spontaneously transitions from supervision-intensive to incentive-intensive, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of value creation. These findings provide a principled basis for designing dynamic governance mechanisms and advance the platform governance literature by establishing the central role of the platform enterprise’s value preference parameter in coordinating endogenous governance instruments.

SymmetryVol. 17(11)
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (CN), Hang Seng University of Hong Kong (HK), University of Hong Kong (HK)
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Digital Platforms and Economics
2.23
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