No Easy Compatibilism

ABSTRACT Traditional compatibilists respond to the Consequence Argument by denying either the fixity of the past or by denying the fixity of the laws, neither of which is without theoretical cost. Recently, however, several authors—Christian List (2019b), Scott Sehon (2016), and Ned Markosian (2012)—have introduced novel approaches to free will that, they claim, imply that determinism is no threat to free will and, thus, that free will and determinism turn out to be compatible. The strategies employed by these authors differ considerably, with one influenced by psychology and decision theory, another by traditional philosophy of action, and the other by the metaphysics of causation. Nevertheless, this article aims to show, first, that these approaches share a common thread and, second, that each implicitly requires us to give up either the fixity of the past or the fixity of the laws (but without making this explicit or explaining how their views are preferable to traditional compatibilist views with respect to giving up the fixity of the past/laws). The article concludes with an important lesson that may be learned from our survey of these novel and interesting, even if ultimately unsuccessful, approaches to compatibilism.