Why prosocial octopuses challenge the autonomy of psychological states

Abstract Researchers administered MDMA (known as ecstasy) to octopuses and observed their behavior. Due, at least in part, to serotonin transport systems nearly identical to human ones, octopuses on ecstasy behave in a prosocial manner. This observation suggests that neurochemicals, like serotonin, which are conserved across taxa, contribute to the realization of some psychological states. Since standard functionalism claims that not only can psychological states be multiply realized, but that psychological states are also autonomous from neural states, then this eccentric experiment reveals an important challenge. Using recent research in neuroscience and a mechanistic account of multiple realization, I argue that certain cases of multiply realized psychological states always include specific neurochemicals (i.e. neurotransmitters), and this undermines the kind of multiple realization that is needed to warrant autonomy. I conclude that the multiple realization of psychological states does not guarantee autonomy from neural states and that the functionalist claims for autonomy are not empirically justified.