Do victims have the right to be known? Epistemic reparations and historical knowledge

In this paper, I aim to identify and circumscribe the epistemic import of victim voices in relation to past wrongs. The central point of reference for my discussion is Jennifer Lackey’s recent work on epistemic reparations, and especially her argument for the victim’s distinct epistemic right to be known. By relating epistemic reparations to the case of historical knowledge about past wrongs, I spell out how Lackey’s argument for the victim’s right to be known clashes with fundamental scholarly principles of critical historical knowledge. The conflict exposes normative incoherence at the heart of Lackey’s account of epistemic reparations. This incoherence is caused by, (i) ambiguity concerning the extension of the victim’s right to be known, and (ii) failure to provide clear articulations of the precedence of epistemic authority in cases of conflict. The incoherence does not, however, mean that the rights framework must be abandoned. Instead, I suggest resolving the conflict by framing the nature of the victim’s right to be known not as an epistemic but as a moral and political end: the right to be heard.