The optimal subsidy for marine aquaculture weather index insurance: an analysis based on the evolutionary game theory

Abstract In the marine aquaculture industry, weather index insurance provides ideal market conditions for risk diversification and loss compensation. Government subsidies are essential for increasing insurance uptake and protection levels in fisheries insurance. However, the current mariculture insurance market lacks completeness in premium subsidy responsibilities and has unreasonable proportions for subsidy allocation. To address these issues, this study focuses on quantifying the subsidy scale of marine aquaculture weather index insurance and develops a three-party evolutionary game model involving simulations to determine the appropriate scales for various subsidy methods. The results highlight that a reasonable subsidy proportion is crucial for balancing stakeholder interests and maximizing social welfare. The modest subsidy levels are 85%–90% for premium subsidies, 55%–60% for reinsurance, and 45%–100% for operating expense subsidies. This study concludes with practical policy recommendations.