Between Formality and Informality: Socialization and Cohesion in the South Korea–US and Taiwan–US Asymmetric Alliances

ABSTRACT Great powers are often assumed to resort to divide et impera strategies to manage asymmetric alliances. Yet, alliances that cultivate preference convergence, particularly when such convergence is privately accepted, are more resilient and harder to undermine. The role played by intra‐alliance socialization in shaping such convergence, however, remains underexplored. This study addresses this gap by examining how different levels of socialization affect cohesion in asymmetric alliances. The analysis compares the formal South Korea–US alliance (marked by a relatively higher degree of socialization) with the informal Taiwan–US alliance (with a relatively lower degree of socialization). The findings indicate that robust socialization mechanisms, such as military training, joint exercises, and policy coordination, promote greater internalization of US preferences and strengthen alliance cohesion. However, these effects are often constrained by factors such as power asymmetries, divergent threat perceptions, adversarial influence, domestic politics, media control, and historical mistrust. By highlighting the conditional effects of socialization on alliance stability, this study contributes to the constructivist–rationalist debate and advances the conversation on asymmetric security alliances.