Institutionalizing Electoral Malpractice
Under authoritarianism, electoral malpractice not only can be manifest in violations prohibited by law, but also occurs under the guise of legality, thereby acquiring an institutionalized character. Multi-day voting in Russia, while portrayed by the authorities as a measure of convenience for the voters, effectively increases the propensity for malpractice by creating permissive environments for electoral fraud and workplace mobilization of voters, which often involves coercion to vote and bribery of electors. The analysis shows that in the 2021 national legislative elections, the pro-government party was indeed the sole beneficiary of multi-day voting in terms of increasing its officially reported vote share. The impact of multi-day voting upon the electoral performance of the permitted opposition parties was uneven, reflecting the differences among the niches occupied by the permitted opposition parties in Russia’s electoral arena.
Authors
- Grigorii V. Golosov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9769-9230)
- Lev Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-4745-1043)
Institutions
- European University at Saint Petersburg (RU)
- The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RU)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Communist and Post-Communist Studies
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2025.2470661
- Primary Topic
- Benford’s Law and Fraud Detection
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00