Shaky Groundlessness: A Phenomenological Critique of the Enactive Approach

The paper presents a phenomenological critique of the enactive approach inaugurated by Francisco Varela, Eleanor Rosch, and Evan Thompson in The Embodied Mind (1991/2016). The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, to provide a sharper distinction between the natural and the transcendental viewpoints on consciousness against the backdrop of enactivists’ alleged commitment to the latter. On the other hand, to show that the lack of a proper distinction between the viewpoints in question leads to self-inconsistency in the enactive approach. I particularly analyze the enactivists’ idea of the “fundamental circularity” between subjectivity and objectivity, along with the closely related principle of “groundlessness,” and attempt to demonstrate that these ultimately result in circular reasoning rather than “virtuous” or “creative” circularity, as enactivists seem to suggest.