Tracking the Epistemic Harms of Marital Rape: The Case for Experiential Injustice

ABSTRACT Empirical studies suggest that rape in marriages continues to be treated as a less severe crime than other forms of rape. Although the psychological and legal dimensions of marital rape have received some attention, its epistemic harms remain under‐theorised. This article argues that these harms are not exhausted by hermeneutical injustice, where victims lack the conceptual resources to identify or articulate their experience as rape. We introduce the concept of experiential injustice to capture a deeper epistemic harm in which victims, shaped by trauma or internalised oppression, lose evaluative grip on their own experience. Drawing on victims' testimonies, we show how marital rape can erode epistemic self‐trust and diminish the capacity to register harm as experientially significant. These harms resist easy remediation and call for a broader framework to understand how epistemic injustice occurs in the contexts of marital rape. Recognising these layered epistemic harms is crucial for legal and social reforms addressing marital rape.