Evolutionary Dynamics With Environmental Feedback in Asymmetrically Coupled Communities

ABSTRACT This paper extends the framework of classical eco‐evolutionary game theory by establishing an asymmetric two‐community resource coupling model. By defining distinct community types, we simulate the asymmetry in environmental resource management and consumption across communities. Under the assumption that only one community is responsible for environmental resources, we theoretically and numerically analyze the equilibria and their stability. The model exhibits rich dynamic behaviors, including Hopf bifurcations and a heteroclinic network composed of six heteroclinic cycles within the system. To prevent resource collapse, we derive the maximum resource consumption threshold for the irresponsible community. The results show that the conditions for system stability in single‐community models no longer apply in multicommunity systems, and excessive cross‐community interactions may cause systemic risks. This work extends existing research and provides a new theoretical perspective for understanding the asymmetric evolution of multicommunity resource coupling.

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Publication Details

Journal
Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences
Published
2025-11-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/mma.70261
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
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article

Evolutionary Dynamics With Environmental Feedback in Asymmetrically Coupled Communities

Yi Zhong, Chuan Ding
Mathematical Methods in the Applied Sciences
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

Evolutionary Dynamics With Environmental Feedback in Asymmetrically Coupled Communities

Yi Zhong, Chuan Ding
article en

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper extends the framework of classical eco‐evolutionary game theory by establishing an asymmetric two‐community resource coupling model. By defining distinct community types, we simulate the asymmetry in environmental resource management and consumption across communities. Under the assumption that only one community is responsible for environmental resources, we theoretically and numerically analyze the equilibria and their stability. The model exhibits rich dynamic behaviors, including Hopf bifurcations and a heteroclinic network composed of six heteroclinic cycles within the system. To prevent resource collapse, we derive the maximum resource consumption threshold for the irresponsible community. The results show that the conditions for system stability in single‐community models no longer apply in multicommunity systems, and excessive cross‐community interactions may cause systemic risks. This work extends existing research and provides a new theoretical perspective for understanding the asymmetric evolution of multicommunity resource coupling.

Mathematical Methods in the Applied SciencesVol. 49(4)
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 58%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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