Bertrand Russell, Karin Costelloe‐Stephen, and Temporal Experience

From the late 1870s, philosophers became fascinated by the nature of human temporal experience. This paper focuses on two 1910s contributions to this field, both concerned with our experience of temporal relations. In May 1913, Bertrand Russell drafted what would become his oft-cited 1915 Monist article, “On the Experience of Time.” From 1912 to 1919, fellow Cambridge philosopher Karin Costelloe-Stephen authored a series of texts on the subject. Drawing on unpublished archival letters, some of which are currently unknown to the history of philosophy, I argue that, through their philosophic disagreements, these two thinkers affected one another. Costelloe-Stephen's work prompted Russell to claim that the contents of a single present experience need not be simultaneous; and, more broadly, that the specious present is riddled with relations. Meanwhile, Russell's work prompted Costelloe-Stephen to elaborate on her early view that our experience of time is utterly nonrelational—so much so, it lacks a distinction between past and present. This study primarily aims at furthering the scholarship on Russell and Costelloe-Stephen.1 More broadly, it also seeks to show the worth of Costelloe-Stephen's work to 21st century philosophy. It has been said that one value of the history of philosophy is the discipline's ability to rediscover positions that challenge mainstream assumptions today. From this perspective, Russell's famous article is uninteresting: his relation-suffused characterization of the specious present was swiftly picked up by his peers and remains mainstream. In contrast, Costelloe-Stephen's under-studied work is of tremendous interest, for it challenges widely held, current assumptions: that we do perceive temporal relations; that, metaphysically, time comprises a relational series; and that our experience does distinguish past from present. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background. The first part details 1870s–1910s work on temporal experience. The second part briefly explains the relationship between Russell and Costelloe-Stephen, before giving a chronological, contextualized overview of their pertinent writings. Section 3 considers Costelloe-Stephen's impact on Russell's “On the Experience of Time,” while Section 4 considers the impact of Russell's article on his colleague's post-1913 work. Section 5 explores how Costelloe-Stephen's work defies current assumptions, reminding us why it is rewarding to look past the philosophic titans of any given period. Around the turn of the 20th century, philosophy saw a wave of interest in temporal experience, much of it focused on theories of the specious present. These hold that our experiential present, the “specious” present of experience, has duration. The specious present is contrasted with the metaphysical present, usually assumed to be durationless. Here, I merely provide an overview of the historical texts relevant to this paper. For broader histories of temporal experience, see the monumental studies produced by Ian Phillips and Barry Dainton; I have also edited a pertinent collection of papers.2 Shadworth Hodgson's 1878 Philosophy of Reflection is widely credited with developing the theory of the specious present as it is known today.3 Hodgson's (1878, I.249–I.253) broad aim is to understand consciousness. He argues that to be conscious is to “have in consciousness” a “succession,” or “sequence” of different feelings. To analyze this succession of different feelings, he considers the “minimum” of consciousness. Hodgson argues that this minimum of consciousness “has duration” because it always involves at least two sub-feelings, a “change from this to that,” a sense that part is “former” and the other “later.” This leads him to distinguish the metaphysical, time-point “strict present” from “What we loosely call the Present… an empirical portion of the course of time, containing at least the minimum of consciousness.” To illustrate Hodgson's thesis, consider how we seemingly experience succession, events occurring in a sequence before or after one another: we sometimes seem to see traffic lights shift from red to green, or hear a birdcall rise in pitch. If our experiential present were durationless, it would not be possible to experience succession or change that requires duration. the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own… The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration… It is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We do not first first one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole. James’ popularization of this theory only spurred more research.5 Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states… in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. (Bergson 1910, 100) What is, for me, the present moment? The essence of time is that it goes by… we call the present the instant in which it goes by. But there can be no question here of a mathematical instant. No doubt there is an ideal present - a pure conception, the indivisible limit which separates past from future. But the real, concrete, live present - that of which I speak when I speak of my present perception - that present necessarily occupies a duration. (Bergson 1911b, 176) This indivisible continuity of change is precisely what constitutes true duration… That time implies succession I do not deny. But that succession is first presented to our consciousness, like the distinction of a “before” and “after” set side by side, is what I cannot admit… If we cut [a melody]… up into distinct notes, into so many “befores” and “afters,” we are bringing spatial images into it… in space, and only in space, is there a clear-cut distinction of parts external to one another. (Bergson 1946, 176) Here, pure duration is described as indivisible in the sense it cannot be “cut” into “befores” and “afters,” or “parts.” By way of contextualizing the work of Russell and Costelloe-Stephen, this section and others draws on three sets of unpublished archival materials. First, Russell's letters to Ottoline Morrell; from March 1911 onward, for many years, he wrote almost daily. Originals and copies are held in Russell's archives and often cited by historians of philosophy. Second, correspondence between Costelloe-Stephen and Russell, largely held in Russell's archives; these have not been cited by earlier historians of philosophy. Finally, a leviathan correspondence, comprising thousands of letters, between Costelloe-Stephen and other members of her family, held in the archives of her grandmother Hannah Whitall Smith.7 As these latter letters are unknown to historians of philosophy, I will quote from them at some length, especially where Costelloe-Stephen's and These letters for that Costelloe-Stephen was of and that many philosophers her work. Russell and Costelloe-Stephen through Russell's first Russell was Hannah Whitall and In her second Karin in Karin her in I earlier in her Russell in he became to is on both For 5 years, Russell and Costelloe-Stephen at In Costelloe-Stephen as an at From to Russell held a at From at least March Russell his In Costelloe-Stephen a in of the first to a the years, was in to In Costelloe-Stephen a at In for by the by their correspondence, the relationship between Russell and Costelloe-Stephen from that In 1919, Costelloe-Stephen a I have that have been a with at the I do I have been It is one of the I have been I was to while I was in and I was at the of Russell's is not of he not work. In March Russell presented a Philosophy of in that By late Costelloe-Stephen was into her work on presented her first “What by “What to the on In the up to the Costelloe-Stephen's letters to her her states, it to of I it… my of him 1913, of are in I his so 1913, time I he more the time 1913, in paper I so see any that seem to In a to Russell 1913, Costelloe-Stephen that been and I not I have or been my Russell her and the paper was that He was not I to that I his article on we one of Cambridge in which I him what I We a and at the end that it was a to what he He also said I was as a that I a sense for the in to in the the of 1913, Russell was also an known as of In a to on 1913, Russell the May 1913, he its on In 1913, Russell of He would on to its early as Monist “On the Experience of see my of is of the to to to the of as a to to and into which will consider what I to course I to this is what he and that is why I to have it to but my seem to him More on this I with and it He at to that he been so much by my paper and to the details of the I him it of by and by from me, which he what I was He said he not that of which in the because the was on I him that I that for him to he was much and said he to see the as as I I him what my of work to his see what from in to the of the Cambridge and possible between him and He said it was a that much but that he not do and to how my would In the that would often see be Costelloe-Stephen would see the I from with he my paper to He said he it that it was the he that been on his of that it it more he it and that there were in which I of my 1913, more I the more I feel that he is a and the more the I have and him 1913, Costelloe-Stephen that in with to and said her work was that been of at the after Costelloe-Stephen For on May of her wrote a and a in which he said he was at my to my for a in other way in his to Costelloe-Stephen wrote more relevant to is her paper and of the of Russell and and this to the on May and it that The other is her The of of on As her of Costelloe-Stephen to turn her into a drafted it the the in Costelloe-Stephen The of to In he authored its her work as its from his the study as a and of his see in Costelloe-Stephen In the present we be concerned with which our of time is two of have to be and which between and and succession, which It is of the not to of and with of and in many of the in the and of time have from this It will be that present, and from of and while earlier and from of and In a in which there was no experience there would be no present, or but there be earlier and We experience two of temporal relations. of and hold between and the of present, and future. As it, a would and any sense of present, or both an subject. Meanwhile, of and succession hold between and the of earlier and claim that these two of has to is of his on I will how we to of relation in with the between and Russell a certain relation of and but different from any other relation of and The of a is a of are said to be present to their in the experience in which are To when Russell with the sense of a the he that the is Russell as can be contrasted with For Russell we have some of the especially the through We also have some of the past through with past as provides that an is present, provides that an is the The is which the of of is from it comprises a between and It is of us turn to the between and Russell is a relation which is given in experience as sometimes between present to a given in a single For Russell experience between two that form part of one present, as a and a Russell is a relation which hold between two parts of one for between parts of a which is the of one it be To an the parts of one will be present. Russell a theory of the specious present. other he that our present experience can and be This is one why Russell the relation with the relation present in where is a change what is present in one experience, there will be succession, and of between two which are both a specious present, we experience the and as not as both present. For Russell, one is by another, the first is earlier and the second Russell in the of our two a single specious present, is earlier late to early 1910s specious present I argue that Russell's was in two is that almost earlier specious present held that the contents of a specious present are To us Hodgson as a As we saw Hodgson that a minimum of consciousness, the contents of a specious present, a of feelings. We have a sense that one is “former” and the other “later.” Hodgson (1878, also that our perception of these is perception of both is the the minimum of consciousness, and this minimum has For is with To that the contents of my specious present two the of a and the of Hodgson would I can sense that the was former to the I experience both This seem we that we often in a durationless, or Hodgson does not to or would with his that the specious present succession and duration. I him as that the contents of a specious present the as a early specious present also seem to hold a of For that are in a as He does not this perception the but I as the as Hodgson when he that, on our experience of as of the to at the present see a involves the at an what with a that on we can perceive in one present. As we saw James’ of states that an experiential we perceive This paper the I have from Hodgson and it that the specious present, is be known with what is present, and the of To “has the and are to be as occurring in succession be For as for the specious present succession while there are many between the specious present more broadly, the temporal these I them as on this this in us turn to He with earlier specious present that the contents of our experiential present can Russell's characterization of and succession that two are cannot also be Russell the of earlier specious present that the contents of a specious present are The historical specious present that what is present is is in the it was the not In his the that contents can to a of consciousness that and are one in the of a perception of temporal the of consciousness in which a perception can no be or up For we perceive temporal as succession, and I to be the of an of perception temporal as succession, its contents cannot be present. I up late which I but not that I on is not so as I He is at of what but no at and he the by his I cannot there are any that are any to or three on which I are in the Russell does not the on which I But his of and this us to the other way that Russell's specious present theory is his experiential present is at a time and time, with relations. The in of present and past to of hold between and of succession hold between and the that Russell the specious present from by it is that both theories are Russell at these I point to the work of of this work is concerned with pure study the of time is to Costelloe-Stephen to be one of the of the to have it is Costelloe-Stephen's of goes we saw that, for pure duration is indivisible in that its states cannot be it cannot be “cut” into “befores” or Costelloe-Stephen the of pure duration in as and as temporal relations. is, in it Costelloe-Stephen was merely philosophy into that Cambridge philosophers would This is not the By pure duration as and is two but These distinguish Costelloe-Stephen's from that of this was part of what the in when he described her as If an is with a state which state with which is in the of consciousness, this us the for the temporal between and In there is no before or after we them into In their which is their are not To his theory of duration what has to show is that we have of some in which the past with the present in the that the past and present are so that form a of as to a series of distinct by that us this He that by to our consciousness through a of its duration we can that it forms a of pure past and present do not form a series of by that past and present form an of As Costelloe-Stephen it, pure duration is not or it is in a this of forms an it lacks temporal relations. these I argue that her work “On the Experience of Time.” As we saw Russell the of her paper “What and to her of to on May on May Russell “On the Experience of Time.” In Russell was the nature of the specious present. work the of that present to the by that two conscious states are are from James’ of Time.” Costelloe-Stephen the that when we to our consciousness through a of its conscious states form a series of distinct by relations. this relational series would not be in any I these of Russell to that view and more broadly, the relational of the specious present. To how “On the Experience of affected Costelloe-Stephen's we into her of into argues we pure duration not through the but through do not But we live it, because this Russell the In Russell described philosophy as is at its in and Russell that when philosophy “has will and will be to on the of Costelloe-Stephen with early at this “What and to claim that with its see Costelloe-Stephen and is that be in and Costelloe-Stephen with it as pure of This Costelloe-Stephen to claim that Russell and on that certain of our is given by What on is is given by study of and this he that, by their this the in Russell's on their a claim the nature of and their I on much for the I If I I will the a as I to it of the with which we are and which are the of our of time, I Costelloe-Stephen's to this question in two from that of The first temporal relations. As we have “What and to claim that our temporal experience is These early the that Costelloe-Stephen not the to their consciousness time and not have this experience. I that the “On the Experience of have as a In any at some point after 1913, Costelloe-Stephen set her of this specious present and states, is that there are no a of is an of Costelloe-Stephen two that this can be as a change that comprises series of events or states in of before and a be as a change that comprises does not a series of distinct in of before and Costelloe-Stephen that, for of change are For Russell, that do not as are Costelloe-Stephen is one of their In The of Costelloe-Stephen to this can be no doubt that is that there is we are This has been given will call it its explains that philosophers what the the when we are with of our experience of temporal relations. is is by of in external a series of one after the in these or is distinct from the and the which it to the others and it its in the series are external to it in the sense that its or it in series it would be the or instant. change as a as a series of on a The are by to Russell's work. The of as that do not their we that are Russell we can a philosophy of for are in and In of Russell in the as I understand it, is the that are the of sense or from the actual change as a series of by temporal while the actual forms a of which does not any as in relations. The more we from the sense and the more we see that this of is the essence of what we and the more we how a is to any series of in relation of the does not by and is not held by relations. This is a on “On the Experience of precisely that we are with the relation of “succession,” that this relation between of that a In contrast, Costelloe-Stephen that we any of The does not it is not by there are no the does not or of any The between this and her on this point is As we have for Russell, our temporal experience is with temporal relations. As Costelloe-Stephen our temporal experience lacks and The second way Costelloe-Stephen's of what we are with from Russell's the distinction between our past and present. As we saw that we experience past and present states as an Costelloe-Stephen this thesis, and goes The of argues that from and as and a argues that the actual there are not any cut as the and and present in not Costelloe-Stephen wrote was conscious of Russell's “On the Experience of that through we become with in a way as to that are through that are her utterly the that her described as of experience. I that “On the Experience of Costelloe-Stephen and the between their on both these To Costelloe-Stephen that the contents of a specious present form a a that does not a series of distinct in of before and these contents form a succession, a are not or in the form a We are with this a This is the known present is itself a and between events it… and there will be two events a and both in the present, but the a will be to the In the to his article The of and are in is when we hear a and that of two notes, both of which in our specious present, one the In his history and philosophy of time, The of explains in are or the is given with the that Russell that through we can experience a and through fellow and in also provides a of the specious present, one that for consciousness of and Russell's work is in the of Philosophy on see In contrast, Costelloe-Stephen's work was not picked this is for her work was widely and In to Costelloe-Stephen's letters to her with In 1913, of “What is a of in the at the years, from and as fellow to one at the In 1913, wrote of on “What said that the on that been been by a at the 1919, Costelloe-Stephen in a on and alongside the of and The with The of some of the Costelloe-Stephen was with the and of said he would be the not in it he to my work was that Meanwhile, in Costelloe-Stephen in his of the He “What as of the of that I have and prompted to that its is the of of Costelloe-Stephen's in the is, as much do it see wrote of to this to to much an of actual The of at least two I have it to him he to seem to not to to see what there was in I this will him see it but I like it It to be my to and understand I to see Russell's of The of was has no in is a of that the history of philosophy can be to philosophy. For to that the for work on any philosophic is to study the which have been for it by of from other as much as In this argues the history of philosophy philosophy to itself from so are For the of and is to look of Costelloe-Stephen's work is of interest in three The that temporal succession, and duration are experience. some have to for argues that we cannot temporal between Here, I set Experience is a and, as in time with its parts in temporal to one another. to we he considers his that perceive temporal so that he it a these two philosophers the show how Costelloe-Stephen's it is worth that, to and Russell, the that our specious present temporal was to a series of before and after one of time the of which is its The is that with no how many and no in what relation cannot the change and time which as I that does not that no in what cannot our experience of is Costelloe-Stephen's work her as a time does not any of series by relations. Costelloe-Stephen's work us that the and do not possible of be As as I a is not of the that time comprises a series by is also to the Finally, on Costelloe-Stephen's of temporal experience, we do not distinguish between the past and present. the that we do is widely by on both of the theory Russell, hold that present, and are with Russell, many hold that are merely I not of any thinkers the that at our distinguish past from present. The of this I of can be in the the we can that we are present and not Costelloe-Stephen's work an so widely held it is as an This paper has that Costelloe-Stephen's work on temporal experience affected and he affected why Russell's work study is that it structured today. why Costelloe-Stephen's work study is that it not what us to other that the experience and nature of time