The Institutional Effect: Democracies, Dictators and Diversionary Foreign Policy

The diversionary theory of war remains controversial in International Relations. The extant literature remains dominated by the study of democratic diversions and the use of warfare as the prime diversionary strategy. The sheer amount of work covering democratic diversions has created theoretical biases which are oft transposed to autocratic states, despite being largely unique to democratic processes. This article expands the traditional bounds of diversionary theory to provide a logic of autocratic diversions and diversionary strategies outside of war, presenting a theoretical framework which argues that institutionalization is the primary conduit through which the intended audience, benefit and preferred diversions are dictated. In doing so, I argue institutionalization functions as a diversionary multiplier, with higher levels of institutionalization allowing for the utilization of smaller-scale diversions, with the inverse being true. This article advances an initial theoretical framework and offers some preliminary illustrative support in an effort to advance the debate on autocratic diversions and move the diversionary theory of war to one of broader foreign policy.