Explaining Moral View Change: Second-Order Moral Reasoning

Abstract In contemporary studies of moral change, philosophers identify psychological and socio-structural conditions and explain how they cause changes in people’s moral views. However, empirical studies show that the conception of moral agency implied in the existing accounts—that individuals are the function of pre-existing psychological and social structures—should be reexamined. Many people change their moral views based on their core values and concerns. In this paper, I set out to develop the idea of “second-order moral reasoning” to highlight a currently underexplored conception of moral agency and introduce a new model for explaining moral view change. This model recognises individuals’ ethical freedom—the fact that no single moral system can fully determine one’s morality. Instead of responding directly to the information they receive, many individuals engage in second-order moral reasoning and determine, in light of their values and concerns, whether they should adjust their views. Finally, using the case of honour killings in Pakistan, I demonstrate how the idea of second-order moral reasoning can inspire a new approach to moral intervention—one that facilitates the eradication of harmful practices and the development of a tolerant society.