On the argument against abortion from African normative personhood

One influential understanding of the African normative conception of personhood says that humans have moral status because they have the capacity for sympathy. It is tempting to think that this account of moral status forbids abortion because foetuses have the potential for the capacity for sympathy, which guarantees them a right to life. I outline the strongest possible argument along these lines before observing that it faces some serious challenges. First, it does not do enough to explain why the mere potential for the capacity for sympathy is valuable. Second, it fails to explain why partial moral status guarantees a foetus the right to life in all circumstances unless an extreme form of pacificism is assumed. Third, it does not do an adequate job of explaining the moral status of either disabled foetuses or adult humans who will never have the potential for the capacity for sympathy. I conclude that it is doubtful that any account of African personhood will be able to successfully show that abortion is always impermissible.