An Anti-Humanistic Justification for the Use of Violence as a State of Higher Necessity in International Relations

This article explores the conditions under which violence is deemed admissible in international relations understood as interactions among political communities. Its main objective is to identify and examine anti-humanist arguments that, by invoking the notion of extraordinary circumstances, seek to legitimise the resort to force. Such arguments range from biological and sociobiological perspectives to positions that challenge the axiological foundations of the contemporary international order. To refine the research problem, the study poses two guiding questions: (1) What arguments can be presented in favour of the use of violence in international relations? (2) What is the acceptance limit on arguing the use of violence in international relations?Methodologically, the analysis deploys a three-track qualitative approach. First, a critical reading of selected work in social philosophy, biology, ethology, sociobiology and primatology captures the biological bases of intra-species violence. Second, a hermeneutic examination of Carl Schmitt’s key concepts – politicality, the state of exception, sovereignty and nomos – reconstructs the political dimension of violence. Third, an institutional-legal analysis of the doctrine of necessity, illustrated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, clarifies its juridical contours.Three principal findings emerge: (1) Violence is justified within three distinct yet interconnected frames: biological, political and legal, (2) Each frame entails the dehumanisation of “others” and the suspension of universal moral norms, thereby normalising violence as a policy instrument, (3) The boundaries of acceptable justificatory discourse are fluid, extending from the naturalisation of violence to its formal legalisation under exceptional circumstances.