The 2024 Revision of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine and Its Nuclear Strategy: Applying Schelling’s Brinkmanship

This study examines Russia’s 2024 revision of its nuclear doctrine in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The revision substantially eased conditions for nuclear use, broadened the scope of potential adversaries, and shifted the definition and principles of military threats to a more offensive posture, raising grave international concerns. Yet, despite institutionalizing the legitimacy of nuclear use, Russia has simultaneously refrained from actual employment or overt threats, reflecting a paradoxical stance. To account for this contradiction, the study applies Thomas Schelling’s concept of brinkmanship, which emphasizes the institutionalization of uncertainty and risk as a means of deterrence. The analysis demonstrates that Russia heightened the structural possibility of nuclear crisis while withholding actual use, thereby achieving deterrence and creating justification for concessions in potential negotiations. This dual approach suggests that nuclear brinkmanship may paradoxically contribute not only to deterrence but also to opening pathways toward peace. By addressing the limitations f traditional deterrence theory, which relies heavily on the assumption of rational actors, this research proposes a new analytical framework and highlights significant implications for security strategies on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.