Reconsidering Instrumentality, From Mechanical Causality to Overdetermination and Political Articulation

This paper challenges the dominant epistimologies in understanding instrumentality through an inspiration from the theoretical works of the Essex School, initiated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. A central tenet of this approach is that the relationship of epistemology to ontology is not neutral or divorced. Epistemologically, empirical claims about instrumentality can be assessed as true or false. However, as Glynos and Howarth (2007: 7) would argue, such claims inevitably disclose an underlying ontological dimension that their proponents may not recognize. As Heidegger similarly demonstrated, technology—closely linked to instrumentality—is never pragmatically neutral but consistently exhibits a particular mode of understanding the world: “The essence of technology is by no means anything technological” (1977: 4). Departing from this principle, this contribution investigates mechanical causality as the dominant epistemology in understanding instrumentality. Originating in natural sciences, it reduces social and political phenomena to technical cause–and-effect relations, stripping them, among many aspects, of their complexities. This epistemology is so pervasive that even critical efforts to debunk how technology or instrumentalities reduce the world to a resource to be exploited often remain confined within the very logic they seek to resist—framing their critique through the same cause–and-effect models they aim to deconstruct. A more transformative approach would require moving beyond these epistemological assumptions altogether, rather than remaining trapped within their conceptual boundaries and limits. This contribution argues that mechanical causality tends to obscure the multiplicity of ways in which instrumentality constitutes both its subject and object—if such a distinction can even be maintained. Hence, it is questionable whether a strict cause–and-effect reading is essential to all instrumentalities, particularly when analyzing social and political phenomena. Therefore, we need to offer an alternative to both the positivist ontologies that ground mechanical causality and the anti-positivist frameworks that reject all causality whatsoever. The key to this goal is emphasizing the contingency of political meanings and the role of antagonism in constituiting social practices. The works of Laclau and Mouffe inspire this alternative, and populism, one of their central research themes, can be a field to develop and test an alternative explanation of instrumentality. Populism is often reduced explicitly or implicitly by political and social sciences to a sort of instrumental reason discourse. Similarly, although Laclau and Mouffe firmly reject hard positivism, even the one of critical theory that they share several features with, it would be interesting to check if their reading of populism itself echoes an instrumental reasoning. The paper raises a critical question, which I also ask elsewhere (Atif 2024, 2025): Can the articulation of diverse political demands into a unified popular front—central to their theory of populism—be rightly interpreted as an instrumentalist approach, or would such an interpretation be a reductive misreading? This paper proposes that, following Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2005), populist instrumentality is not simply a manipulative operation, but a distinctive logic of articulation that articulates political identities and struggles. Rather than acting upon preexisting sets of political problems and social dilemmas, populism actively reconfigures these issues and transformes them into collective mobilization sites of political action. Building on these theoretical premises, the next section will explore the contingent nature of mechanical causality in framing instrumentality. It shows how causality not only frames instrumentality but is also at the origin of its denigration. This view reduces instrumentality to a means-to-an-end logic, ultimately foreclosing alternative conceptualizations that would recognize its constitutive role in political and ontological meaning-making. In his introduction to the first volume of Technics and Time, The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler (1998) explains how causality has been essential in separating epistêmê and tekhne and thereby positions technical knowledge as secondary. This separation is rooted in the dispute between the philosopher (Socrates) accusing the Sophist (Giorgias) of instrumentalizing logos as a rhetorical means of power and a renunciation of knowledge. Since then, a division between technē and epistēmē persisted, which, according to Stiegler, had not yet been made in Homeric times. This early framing gave rise to an ontological distinction, where natural beings were seen as having an “internal” principle of movement and change, a kind of self-causation. In contrast, technical beings, being artifacts, were thought to lack this quality, as they derive their purpose and function from external causes imposed by human creators. This notion of external causality in technical beings inherently limits them to be a means to an end, a tool whose purpose is imposed upon it from the outside rather than one it generates from within. The absence of self-causality or intrinsic purpose renders technical beings secondary, mere extensions of human will or need. This view persists as philosophy traditionally considers technical artifacts “inert,” incapable of true evolution or self-driven change. According to Stiegler, it was only through later thinkers such as Marx and Engels, who introduced a dialectical view of tools and organic forms, that the rigid boundary between inert (technical) and living (organic) entities began to blur. Since then, philosophers, ethnologists, and paleontologists reevaluated the instrumental causality attributed to technics, opening up the possibility for alternative epistemologies. Heidegger's philosophy is a good illustration of this shift, as his discussion of technics begins with a philological examination of Greek conceptions of causality; he thinks one should doubt that the Latin translation of the Greek aition as causa is correct. In Latin, it means “that which brings it about that something turns out as a result in such and such a way” (Heidegger 1977: 7). However, the Greek word for causa, aition, means “being responsible for something else” (1977: 10). Thus, an instrumentality does not produce an object as a totality through an instrument. Instead, following Heidegger's argument, Aristotle's model of causality, which is the dominant and animating conception of the reading of causality, would view instrumentality as a logos that reveals a point of departure for a subject's coming into being. If this is the case of Greek technology, at least how Heidegger romanticizes it, the way we understand causality in modern times accordingly impacts the way the world is revealed to us through technology and is therfore, not neutral or immediate. Because our conception of causality is a mechanical one, so is our conception of instrumentality. Modern technology frames the world, including humans, within an ordering that closes our eyes to the being of the instrumental objects and instead reduces their beings to mere standing reserves (der Bestand). In other words, subjects become uniformly subsumed into an epistemology of sufficiently exploited resources. Here, a calculative approach becomes the only standard by which the object's being is measured. We look at the instrumental subject not to know but to change, which, for Heidegger, is a danger. In these terms, the problem is that what permits thinking instrumentality inhibits thinking the being of the object of the instrumental object. This is how Heidegger shows that modern technology reveals the world as a challenging fourth (Herausfordern) and not as a leading fourth from concealment into unconcealment (her-vor-bringen). Hence, mechanical causality is an epistemological description of instrumentality that lacks direct transparency to its ontological foundations but rather reveals a specific way of viewing the world. This critique extends beyond Heidegger's works to the broader critiques of instrumental reason, as seen in Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, where reason is stripped of its reflective and emancipatory potential, becoming a mechanism of domination. Similarly, Marcuse's analysis of technological rationality and Arendt's concern with the dominance of fabrication over action both reflect a concern about the reduction of meaning to calculable outcomes. Therefore, it is essential to examine how instrumentality shapes our understanding of the world beyond the reductive depiction offered by modern technology, which conceives the world solely as a “standing reserve.” This paper's main contribution lies in refusing to dwell melancholically on this state of affairs but to conceive another understanding of instrumentality, especially if we have just assumed that there is nothing essential to its taming and closure by mechanical causality. This paper argues that populism, as theorized by Laclau and Mouffe, can be interpreted as an alternative mode of framing the world—one that reactivates this “standing reserve” and reconfigures it in new terms. To advance this argument, the following section first critiques the ontological basis of mechanical causality, demonstrating how such a critique fosters a more reflexive epistemology. The gap on which this paper builds to change our conception of instrumentality is that the condition to understand instrumentality as a simple causeand-effect relationship is to assume ontologically that only as an between a subject and what it In this to a mechanical of the instrumental relationship remain by and they may change they ultimately to their To this mechanical on instrumentality, I that we the ontological condition where is only by the of all subjects as both external and This is as subjects through their in the social and political this the notion that the relationship within instrumentality is as if it the of a renders such instead is a logic of Because subject is contingent and to the instrumental itself becomes and This is when is seen as subjects assumed to have a ontological no for or In contrast, that subjects as Laclau and of antagonism argues and Mouffe To develop this they explicitly upon interpretation of causality in on on reading of Marx of of causality. out that, for the condition of is more than a between the and of in the between be an of and so that their origin and they into a Hence, conception of causality be to a or a that impacts its as a Instead, social totality is a in which and the and the in and not to a mere mechanical between diverse Thus, Marx had to beyond of causality dominant in his the mechanical one and the one which would an of its and its and in Marx an of causality that has its in the philosophy of in their should be with an theoretical in a that rather than only direct and Rather than being this of causality up a where meaning is not simply but be actively Hence, although to a contingent is for this This understanding of articulation with with of in in the and he challenges the mechanical conception of articulation In The of explains that from the of in the the that generates through and when a or a point that diverse in from as the of one to one may be or when through with another or Thus, the is in of that meanings into of the and or the with these this model of can be to more of within of rather than through a that ontological is instrumentality can it can obscure this through In this is by an which political may but can never However, this does not a cause–and-effect relationship between empirical instrumentality and its ontological As there is a relationship at of instrumentality the very of instrumentality at the ontological is is never or this persists no empirical of instrumentality can or be specific instrumental its limits or in the at the ontological This on instrumentality that even calculative of in or mechanical A particularly is populism, which is often as a of manipulative instrumental rather than as a populism also reveals and the contingent nature of political The following section Ernesto theory of populism, which from a with the positivist understanding of his theory the articulation of social demands as central to the rise of populism, it may being as that populist demands to a of popular The next aim to instrumentality in to populism, on Laclau and theoretical to a more reading that such reductive Laclau and on populism is not a simple explanation of the for but an approach that to understand the logic of collective in The first that Laclau to the of populism and of is to the into that he which not but the result of this social and can ultimately into as a unified political brings diverse and and by specific and a political a dominant or In this a to or collective or also being a with a more often with or may remain when it into a a more and theory on this where demands become when into a of This is to the of a collective as the as of a broader is by a between and an other the as a yet in to the dominant Here, through populism, Laclau that a can be to a as The conception of demands his political which the contingent and political of Laclau in remaining and not positivist in his of The on whether we the demands in instrumental terms. may be about whether this articulation of demands can remain to the in which instrumentality is The is that the mechanical causality in instrumentality the contingent and of instrumentality, as a may reduce the demands to be essential that can all the of a populist rather than their as Laclau and Mouffe In the next I that theory this reductive understanding by it with Heidegger's that instrumentality reduces the world to a standing Heidegger technology as an ontological framing of the which including human beings, is reduced to or standing to be and instrumentality becomes a mode of that renders beings as and This view of instrumentality as subjects to a standing is if we its with political In the of populism, as a logic of it does not look at demands it on as a standing preexisting to be by calculative Instead, I that approach that this “standing reserve” can be for new political Thus, rather than instrumentality as a mode of framing the world that or populism a kind of that begins with being and to it through political Building on notion of we can the standing not as a and but as something contingent and to articulation this populism does not the standing as it reactivates and reconfigures it into new collective instrumentality solely as a of the world to a standing with what Laclau an logic that demands the underlying the possibility of antagonism and alternative In contrast, populist challenges this closure by or from dominant it for new political and the field of This with Heidegger's understanding of instrumentality not as a mere mechanical but as a mode of way of framing the world. However, it beyond his of technology as only framing the world as a standing by opening for a more the of theory of populism, instrumentality can be as a political of and dominant calculative Here, the of a central which to the of social ontological condition that populist to by of the of as a contingent political The of of to the constitutive as a to the ontological possibility of mechanical reduction to In a populist instrumentality not by meaning but by to social their into a collective of This of becomes the very condition for political rather than the of an In such an interpretation would a even Heidegger's Heidegger, instrumentality in a populist articulation be how the articulation of a social itself to the articulation of the is an for In means If we of the causality in this instrumentality as to the of the the meaning of aition as “that to which something is will be more (Heidegger 1977: 7). In this the populist articulation is responsible for the for Heidegger, the Greek word for our understanding from to the of to something that was not into and Thus, the instrumentality of a populist articulation to a Similarly, a in the of populism, moving from a simple empirical description of a political as to a of the and of the of collective This brings with it of causality, to of mode to a instrumentality to a technical of causality. The other with the in instrumentality to This Heidegger's examination of instrumentality, particularly in his analysis of the distinction between and or In technology was a of a that beings to in their Aristotle's causality the as but as an mode of the does not they in a that the essence to A for does not an external on but works with its potential, the into This mode of fosters unconcealment the to In the of populism, a that with would that the as a by such as or a In this populism from a beyond human by these external This approach populism as having an end, it in of purpose or rather than the that it In contrast, articulation is with as a is not according to a preexisting logic but from something A populist as is more than just a it is a that diverse social to a that only as a The populist articulation this the as a in its strict a a on the of the Thus, instrumentality in populism is not about something into the world but also about function with not in an or but as the of something into being outside the This with the articulation of the which challenging them and This between the of and the of its can also be in Heidegger's particularly in in In this Heidegger the of the as a means of the of technology and the of human This is especially to the of instrumentality and and seen both the the same of technology and of the of the (Heidegger However, the of the is not a simple as will be later in As we can in Heidegger between or and who have to their and This a of which by between the and the Heidegger, a not simply as a they a of and where what is be actively assumed as a This is the essence of Heidegger's of the The as with Heidegger's notion of an of as the through to become so does populist articulation the of the as a subject through discourse. Populism is not of preexisting identities but a that a with Populism is not just an to a preexisting but a that meanings to new political This with notion of populism as an that to a social as Heidegger's through populism through a articulation that political Building on the in this the next section proposes an alternative epistemology of instrumentality to the political and social It an epistemological from mechanical models of causality, instead to explanation by for a of that can for the political contingency and within instrumental in to and understanding of these and these ontological us an alternative epistemology to the instrumental between the subject and the object of an instrumental relationship in social and political This epistemology should or what we as an to the of mechanical In other words, the very logic of this of explanation is not a one, but it that it from a and being by is the of of these Howarth and Glynos a logic is a it as have all its that not it to be positivist and by Instead, to what antagonism does to the not only is logic by other but it also them to by inspiration from Howarth and we would that a logic does not to the of an instrumental as aim to Instead, a logic builds on to that ontological to the to the being of these instrumentalities and Howarth Therefore, a logic does not to the of the subjects of instrumentality as causality it is as it the nature of the of an instrumental Thus, as a logic, it does not as but it has a It is and by other its The is specific as for Laclau and Mouffe it to a specific and political by a particular of power relations, and struggles. It is not a but rather a contingent articulation of that meaning and social The goal is not to in a discussion on instrumentality, as an of would but to its The of logic is not an in itself but a means to a more It to new on instrumentality. this means that to understand instrumentality, we need not just one logic, but all of which both and This approach the to and a new epistemological alternative to mechanical causality. This new the of instrumentality between following who that there is a relationship between empirical and ontological instrumentality. instrumentality, by political and for is only ontological to ontological ontological instrumentality is empirical instrumentality consistently of the ontological the first of this the aim is to the logic of how empirical instrumentality shows itself as only a that will and as having no political nature or Here, the aim is to an for the of the of an instrumentality and the of it This is what Glynos and Howarth to as a social logic, the underlying and that instrumentality, but as natural rather than political or instrumentality, therfore, becomes and and through this its and The next is the of this social logic, which on the of within which the instrumentality is The goal is to beyond instrumentality as a of empirical that can its The goal is to this instrumentality and examine its to its and the of The aim is also to on how it or that linked Here, we in the of this instrumentality to the what ontological instrumentality, by how it to ontological through the of empirical We this through other that recognize the contingent ontology of instrumentality by on the political contingency and of instrumental Glynos and Howarth to these political and with to in the case of the political between and and in the case of the between and Hence, logic in this alternative epistemology is a reflexive that to whether it is at with our ontological basis of antagonism where subject is and by its logic the contingency and within The political does not to in its reduced to political and it is about all of of a subject's contingent nature In the case of instrumentality, this to the between its and The to on instrumentality, where it shows itself as a simple and the of the entities it as instrumental one to the other which is the of instrumental it will be to instrumentality to mere technical positivist is about of when a political an logic of when the relationship between a subject and what it is instrumental for is as in terms, as As in both political of and constitutive of the constitutive and ontological of subject by Laclau and Mouffe. This in of that persists its to of that the how the between and instrumentality to and subjects Glynos and the nature of where the of an instrumentality its a role in the of this is not to be a to instrumentality is through the same ontology of antagonism that Laclau and Mouffe Glynos and Howarth that all meaning is is not to a a that a Instead, have the same as political logic and features that a kind of in the instrumentality. This is not only in the dimension of between the that an instrumentality if and the that it if The of instrumentality also in when the subject the of instrumentality or when it is as or as a of a of the of Laclau and Mouffe and and the of this paper as a of Laclau and in populism, as these have become one of the dominant in populism the to Laclau and Mouffe to their theory to simple where for it to a of and to the between the and the would the of a populist and them an that often the of their theoretical it a for many to antagonism as a for or as an for In this it becomes to Laclau and theoretical its empirical such as that reduce populist to instrumental cause–and-effect We can also this the of instrumentality. to that philosophy does not to an instrumental that Laclau and theory which he with of several in instrumentalizing the and However, this to be does not in of instrumentality. Instead, his understanding of instrumentality is reduced to a tool that Hence, he argues that the ontological of antagonism as a for the of we that instrumentality, which is to be an means to an end, is an tool of This the problem that instrumentality is in a positivist of whether it can the for which it is or Instead, we need to the meaning of instrumentality when it on contingent that contingent instrumental although never a for what they instrumental for and This where we on the one ontological contingency and the of contingent instrumentality to of instrumentality in new an interesting rather than it of its empirical This has from the and by