Regulatory capture in UK alcohol licensing policy: The 2025 ‘licensing taskforce’ report

The UK Government has launched an expedited review of alcohol licensing, based on the report of a taskforce dominated by industry advocates. If adopted, the proposals could undermine foundational principles of licensing practice, reduce accountability and hollow out the power of elected licensing committees. The licensing of alcohol retail is a key policy mechanism in alcohol harm prevention, and the most widely used system globally for regulating the number, density, operating hours and retail practices of alcohol outlets [1, 2] (pp. 129–155). Under the Licensing Act (2003), licensing in England and Wales is governed by local authority committees, made up of elected councilors, albeit within a highly permissive framework requiring all applications to be granted unless representations are lodged by ‘responsible authorities’ and accepted by the licensing committee. In April 2025 the UK Treasury (economic and finance ministry) launched a ‘licensing taskforce’ to review the 2003 Licensing Act [3] and propose a ‘more agile and enabling approach to [alcohol retail] licensing with a greater focus on growth’ (p. 3). It reported in June [4], and the government response warmly welcomed its recommendations. The foreword, written by the Minister for Services, Small Business and Exports, not only described licensed hospitality as ‘foundational’ to the UK economy, but as ‘sell[ing] happiness, creating lasting memories’, and providing ‘the glue that binds us together as a society’ [5]. Language that, if used in alcohol marketing, would possibly breach the industry's own codes of conduct [6]. The taskforce was jointly chaired by the Minister for Services, Small Business and Exports and the chief executive officer (CEO) of the pub retailer and brewer, Greene King. Members included the CEOs of the Night Time Industries Association (NTIA), UK Hospitality, Live music Industry Venues and Events (LIVE) and SixTillSix (‘the UK's leading leisure, hospitality and night time economy consultancy’). Its three working groups were chaired by the CEOs of NTIA and UK Hospitality. The Department of Health and Social Care was not included in the process; nor, despite public health acting as a responsible authority for local licensing committees, were any public health bodies. No information is provided as to the evidence considered or who was consulted [4]. Industry organisations have consistently advocated for further liberalisation of on-trade licensing to boost the night-time economy (NTE). In 2024, the NTIA launched a radical ‘manifesto’ for licensing reform, shifting the emphasis from regulation to place-making and economic enablement [7]. The CEO of the NTIA has publicly stated that this document ‘without doubt … played a part in influencing the recent licensing [taskforce]’ [8]. It also, explicitly, seeks to do so through unaccountable mechanisms that evade scrutiny. The stated purpose of the National Licensing Policy Framework is to ‘rebalance’ licensing practice ‘without the need for major legislative change and … parliamentary intervention’ (pp. 12–13). The judgements of unaccountable local licensing officers are to ‘carry the highest weight’, with any contradiction by elected committee members triggering ‘immediate and expedited appeal’ (p. 25). No indication is given as to who would be empowered to amend Statements of Licensing Policy, nor how licensing officers would be held accountable. Critically, the report says nothing on sales in shops or online, despite around 75% of UK alcohol retail occurring through off-trade [10]. The proposed reforms would inevitably weaken the ability of local authorities to regulate off-trade sales, making it harder to decline licences or restrict hours of sale or delivery. Consequently, the report recommendations could have far-reaching health impacts beyond any changes to the NTE. The government response enthusiastically endorses the report, characterising current licensing practice as ‘lack[ing] proportionality, consistency and transparency – creating barriers to growth and investment for business’ [5] (p. 2). It welcomes the creation of a National Licensing Policy Framework, while acknowledging that establishing this would be a ‘significant undertaking’, and accepts the principle of introducing ‘licensing circulars’ (p. 5). While noting that expanding licensing officers’ powers would be difficult, it commits to ‘exploring all available avenues’ to achieve the recommended changes (p. 5). It also commits to introducing the proposed ‘amnesty’ on licensing conditions. While sympathetic to the call for higher evidential thresholds, the government notes (correctly) that the 2003 Licensing Act ‘already has a mechanism for licensing authorities to assess the validity of representations’. Nevertheless, it pledges to explore ways evidential standards can be clarified (p. 7). While it rejects the automatic inclusion of off-sales in on-sales licences, it notes that recent reforms mean adding off-sales now requires only a minor variation to existing licences. Finally, it proposes establishing a Licensing Working Group within the Hospitality Sector Council—an industry advisory body, whose membership overlaps with the licensing taskforce—to ‘advance broader proposals’ (p. 11). Thus creating further mechanisms for commercial actors to shape licensing reforms going forward [11]. The taskforce report aims to fundamentally reframe the purposes of alcohol licensing in England and Wales: moving from public protection to the promotion of private interests. Conducted at speed, with minimal public scrutiny, systematically excluding health considerations and dominated by commercial interests, it constitutes a clear case of ‘regulatory capture’ [12, 13]. As Li observes, regulatory capture operates not only through overt lobbying but by shaping ‘the cultural understandings that give rise to durable policies and regulatory agencies over time’ [[13] (p. 1218)]. The licensing taskforce report is the latest episode in a longstanding struggle for control over the meaning and purposes of alcohol licensing, which has been documented in the UK and globally [14-18]. The strategic goal of reframing licensing as business enablement—and embedding the notion that alcohol retailers simply ‘sell happiness’—is key to establishing a permissive regulatory environment in which placing constraints on outlet numbers, density or operating hours becomes increasingly difficult. This has important implications beyond just England and Wales, illustrating how regulatory capture is often achieved through technical mechanisms that may, at face value, appear minor. This is especially so for licensing, where much of the detail that shapes outcomes sits ‘in the weeds’ of statute and guidance. International research has documented how shaping the technicalities of regulatory systems is used to influence policy outcomes across alcohol [19], tobacco [20] cannabis [21] and other industries. In alcohol policy this is a particular, although not exclusive, risk in low- and middle-income countries. With greater access to specialist skills, commercial actors are well placed to exploit the technicalities of regulatory mechanisms to achieve their goals. The UK taskforce review is just a recent example of the urgent need for robust regulatory expertise in public health research and advocacy, regardless of setting. Licensing enables states to place regulatory constraints on unchecked commercial practices because, despite social and economic benefits (and regardless of arguments for supporting night-time industries), alcohol retail can also create social, health and economic harms. International evidence shows that weakening constraints risks exacerbating those harms [1, 2], and UK evidence suggests the use of licensing powers can improve health outcomes [22]. Negotiating the boundaries of regulatory control is a matter of public concern, as the impacts of alcohol retail are felt by communities at large. However, the taskforce report and government response seek to shift power significantly towards private, commercial interests. Such regulatory capture should be resisted by anyone with an interest in fair and effective governance, as well as a concern for effectively preventing harm. James Nicholls: Conceptualization (lead); writing—original draft (lead); writing—review and editing (lead). Niamh Fitzgerald: Writing—original draft (supporting); writing—review and editing (supporting). None.