On the edge: Serbia between the west, Russia, and its own course

The war in Ukraine deepened global divisions and pushed even actors with limited power to articulate their positions. Serbia?s reaction - a public condemnation of the invasion, but with a refusal to impose sanctions - goes beyond the usual behaviour of small and medium-sized states that oscillate between balancing and bandwagoning and reflects a thoughtful attempt to manage uncertainty by retaining manoeuvring room within an increasingly fragmented global order. This article examines Serbia?s foreign policy between 2022 and 2025 through the lens of hedging, a strategy that allows smaller states to navigate uncertainty by engaging with rival powers while deferring irreversible choices. Rather than reducing foreign policy to a binary of alignment or resistance, this analysis highlights Serbia?s use of ambiguity as a conscious and calculated position. The theoretical framework is neoclassical realism, which links structural pressures with domestic political dynamics, such as the preferences of the political establishment and the public opinion. This research draws on a qualitative analysis of documents and discourse, including UN voting records, statements by domestic and foreign officials, and EU reports. The findings suggest that Serbia has temporarily sustained its autonomy by exploiting the gaps between competing external expectations. However, as geopolitical lines harden, the space for manoeuvre narrows. This paper argues that Serbia?s hedging strategy illustrates both the opportunities and limitations facing small states that seek to shape, rather than simply absorb, global pressures.