Shareholder agreements in capital markets. Can they really increase firms’ corporate value?

Purpose Shareholder agreements (SAs) are instruments that can stabilize ownership structures and the resulting decisions taken at shareholder meetings. The stability resulting from the use of such agreements can increase the corporate value of listed companies in contexts characterized by low levels of investors protection. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to analyze the impact that one or more SAs can have on the value of Italian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach The analysis was carried out by collecting information on SAs from Italian listed companies. The Italian context is peculiar, as corporate dynamics are comparable to other European countries, yet Italian listed companies widely use these instruments. The information collected was then analyzed using a panel regression model. Findings The results of this study show that both the presence of a voting syndicate and the presence of multiple SAs are positively associated with the market value of Italian listed companies. The authors interpret these results as the consequence of greater stability in the corporate structure alongside a lower level of agency costs. Originality/value The findings of this study confirm a positive association between voting syndicates and corporate value. Furthermore, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the relationship between the presence of multiple SAs and the corporate value of listed firms.