The medium, the gate of perception and how we recognize signs

Abstract Over the years within his logic Peirce proposed many analogous formal definitions of the sign as an element of a triadic relation associating it with an object and an interpretant. However, in 1904, he expanded this triad to a system of six relates, while in 1906, he referred in draft letters and manuscripts to the sign as a medium for the communication of a form. Meanwhile, in the final lecture on pragmatism of 1903, he had claimed that the elements of every concept enter logical thought by the gate of perception and exit by the gate of purposeful action, and the article posits this principle as a basic but necessary framework for the process of semiosis. In 1907, he further advanced the principle that signs and their meaning can be recognized by inference only – they are not given as such in perception. This raises the question of how perception accords with the process of semiosis and with the notion that the sign functions as a medium in this process. The paper explores the implications and analytical potential of this relation associating what is deemed a Peircean conception of semiosis with perception and logic.