State policy of the subjects of the Russian Federation in the sphere of public-private partnership on the example of the Republic of Tatarstan

The article focuses on the importance of the role of public policy in the development of public-private partnership (hereinafter referred to as PPP) using the example of the Republic of Tatarstan. The objective of the article is to prove that the effectiveness of public-private partnership is determined by the quality of public policy, and not only by the amount of financing, using the example of the Republic of Tatarstan. The hypothesis about the presence of structural imbalances in the PPP of the Republic of Tatarstan is tested, despite the leadership in the all-Russian investment climate ratings. The research methodology includes a set of scientific methods: 1) institutional analysis of the structure and interaction of government bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan; 2) comparative analysis of the dynamics of financing of state programs, distribution of PPP projects by industries/forms/stages and rating dynamics (ASI, Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation); 3) statistical analysis of the shares of extra-budgetary financing, dominant legal forms; 4) content analysis of the regulatory framework of the Republic of Tatarstan; 5) SWOT analysis of the PPP model. The practical significance of the study lies in the recommendations aimed at specific measures for the Republic of Tatarstan: diversification of PPP instruments, development of industry risk standards with guarantees for investors, updating the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan No. 50-ZRT. The results form an algorithm for overcoming «investment traps» for leading regions. The theoretical significance of the study lies in identifying the correlation between institutional maturity and structural imbalances in PPP. The results of the study revealed critical imbalances: 1) 78% of PPP projects (127 out of 163) are concentrated in the housing and communal services sector with a minimal presence in the social sphere; 2) 95.7% of projects are implemented as concessions, flexible forms are rarely used; 3) the share of extra-budgetary financing of state programs is only 3.69%, 79.4% of programs are entirely budgetary; 4) the «institutional paradox» is confirmed: a developed management system did not prevent the fall of the Republic of Tatarstan in the PPP rating of the Ministry of Economic Development. The key reason is legal rigidity and the lack of industry-specific risk distribution models.