Bringing War Back In: Victory, Defeat, and the State in Nineteenth‐Century Latin America. By LuisSchenoni, Cambridge University, 2024. 326 pp.

To what extent has war influenced state formation and capacity in Latin America? The conventional view holds that Charles Tilly's (1992) theory of state formation—centered on the relationship between war and state-building—does not apply well to Latin America. Luis Schenoni's recent book challenges this perspective, offering a compelling case that war did shape state formation and capacity, particularly in the 19th century. The book makes important contributions to at least two scholarly debates. At a general level, it revisits and expands the classical bellicist narrative of state formation, developing and testing theoretical linkages between war and state building both before and after conflict. At a regional level, it examines empirically the effect of war on state capacity, providing an explanation for current cross-national differences in state capacity and economic development within Latin America. From a theoretical standpoint, the book provides valuable insight for scholars in International Relations and Comparative Politics, whether they approach the state as a dependent or independent variable. It is also a useful resource for methods instructors, particularly those interested in research design and mixed methods. While its empirical focus is on 19th-century Latin America, the argument yields broader insight relevant to other regions, periods, and contemporary policy challenges. I expand these ideas in the following paragraphs. Schenoni's core argument has two components, the outcome of war and the mechanisms through which war affects state capacity. He argues that war influences state capacity through processes that unfold both before and after conflict, with the postwar mechanism being conditional on the outcome of war. The book develops this argument in three parts: (1) an outline of the theoretical relationship between war and state capacity, (2) cross-sectional evidence, and (3) within-case analysis. From a theoretical standpoint, Schenoni continues and expands an intellectual tradition that places war at the center of state formation and strengthening processes. Drawing on insights from Max Weber and Otto Hintze, the early chapters present a framework connecting war to two different but interconnected processes of state building. This framework translates the classical bellicist theory into an institutionalist language, enabling the integration of sociological and historiographic traditions with contemporary debates in the social sciences. This synthesis constitutes another of the book's contributions. A key innovation is the distinction between how war shapes state-building before and after the confrontation. The prewar mechanism—where states must mobilize resources such as manpower and finances—triggers a coercion–extraction cycle that is relatively well understood. Yet, war can also strengthen or weaken the state long after fighting is over. The key factor that shapes this mechanism is whether a country was victorious. The outcome of a war conditions the political and institutional aftermath of a confrontation. After the war, a losing ruling coalition has less legitimacy and fewer resources to continue in power. Thus, we should expect a change of hands in power or even political instability, which halts or reverses the prewar state building process. By contrast, a winning coalition has renewed legitimacy to continue with the prewar state strengthening process. In these cases, we should expect an increase in state capacity, including extraction and public-goods provision. Crucially, Schenoni treats war outcomes as random, in particular exogenous to prewar state capacity. This element helps separate pre- and postwar mechanisms and supports a stronger causal identification strategy. This focus on war outcomes and mechanisms leads naturally to a mixed-methods research design. While the book surveys wars across the region, it pays more detailed attention to the most intense interstate wars—the War of the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay), the War of the Pacific (Bolivia, Chile, Peru), the US–Mexico War, and the Franco–Mexican War. Section II presents cross-case evidence using fuzzy qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), difference-in-differences, and synthetic control methods, showing that states increased revenue extraction (and coercion) in the lead-up to war, and that postwar public-goods provision varied significantly between winners and losers. Section III complements the empirical strategy with within-case qualitative analysis. These chapters trace three stages of the war–state relationship. First, prewar elite power dynamics are examined, particularly between centralist and peripheral elites (who hold differing visions of state capacity). Notably, even peripheral elites, typically favoring limited state involvement, engaged in state-strengthening efforts in anticipation of war. Second, the chapters explore the uncertainty surrounding war outcomes, drawing on different sources including historiographic data and diplomatic correspondence that show how contingent events shaped conflict trajectories. Finally, these chapters describe the results of the confrontation—political and institutional instability in losing states, and the continuation of state-strengthening projects (such as political parties) in winning ones. The book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on state formation and capacity. Recent scholarship has shifted attention away from war, emphasizing instead factors such as state–democracy relations, the Catholic Church, or the relative strength of monarchs. In this landscape, Schenoni's book does precisely what its title states—it brings war back in the debate. The book reintroduces war as a central variable and updates the classical bellicist explanation through theoretical innovation and empirical rigor. By establishing distinct expectations for pre- and postwar mechanisms, the book generates falsifiable hypotheses, enhancing its explanatory power. Traditionally, war has not been considered a central factor in Latin American state-building, partly due to the region's relatively low political fragmentation and fewer interstate wars compared with Europe but also to the prominence of alternative explanations for weak state capacity, such as debt (Centeno 2002) or market formation (Mazzuca 2021). Schenoni shows that wars in the region were comparable with European ones in terms of resource mobilization, cost, and intensity. The book brings a new explanation for state formation and capacity in the region based on a thorough theoretical elaboration and on fresh evidence. The argument of the volume disputes established explanations of state capacity in Latin America. One of the book's most significant contributions is its explanation of long-term regional development patterns. Historically, colonial centers like Lima were wealthier and had more capable states than peripheral areas such as Costa Rica or Chile, at least before independence. By the early 20th century, this pattern had reversed, and the new ranking has remained stable. Schenoni offers a plausible explanation for this puzzle. The relative difference in state capacity that emerged in the second half of the 19th century may account for this regional transformation. The book constitutes a breakthrough for our understanding of the state in the region and beyond. It offers theoretical insight and empirical evidence to one of the most important debates for the region—why Latin American states remain relatively weak and why state capacity varies across countries. Importantly, the theoretical development is not region or time-specific; while it could have been inspired by the interstate wars after independence that took place across the region, the expectations that it derives can travel beyond 19th-century Latin American states. The research design and evidence are persuasive, especially for the cases covered in the book. Furthermore, the book implements nicely an ideal methodological combination that uses cross-case and within-case evidence to assess a hypothesized effect and its mechanisms. The empirical strategy also makes the book a valuable resource for research design or mixed-methods instructors, which is another highlight of the book. Still, the book could offer more elaboration on the microfoundations of elite behavior. The pre- and postwar mechanisms rest on the preferences of centralist and peripheral elites, the former favoring stronger states. The centralist versus peripheral division is a good heuristic to clarify the position of elites relative to a state building process. Moreover, the text offers strong descriptions of their identities and actions, especially in the chapters that cover the case studies. Yet, it is not always explicit how elites form their preferences over state capacity. The combination of taxation and public-goods provision could affect elites differently depending on economic position or geographic location. For example, landowners' preferences may hinge on whether they produce for internal or external markets, while exporters' preferences could depend on proximity to ports and trade routes. Further development of these microfoundations would be a promising avenue for future research. Latin American states fought wars but played other roles as well. The world economy created strong incentives to connect raw material producers with consumers, and states were a tool to enable market integration. War and markets probably created different incentives for the elite (and nonelite), which arguably can shape varying demands for a stronger state. Future work could explore how competing pressures shaped elite actions toward state building. Schenoni's approach, based on strategic elites, institutions and institutional change, and sensitivity to time and processes, can facilitate a fruitful dialogue with recent scholarship on Latin American states (Aldaz Peña and Baquero-Mendez 2024). Finally, the concluding chapter demonstrates how the argument can travel across time, space, and levels of government. Beyond these implications, the argument of the text can also illuminate policy discussion. In recent years, Latin America has experienced a surge in violence from nonstate actors, particularly those involved in illicit activities such as drug trafficking. Policy responses across the political spectrum include expanding state presence, either through coercive territorial control or increased public goods provision. Hence, fighting nonstate actors could trigger a state-building process. While contemporary conflicts differ from 19th-century interstate wars, key similarities remain—states still require resource extraction and effective policy implementation. Success (or perceived success) in confronting nonstate threats can enhance the legitimacy of the ruling coalition and potentially strengthen a state-building project (of a coercive state, a public-goods provider, or both), whereas failure may weaken state institutions and democracy. Schenoni's framework offers a valuable lens to understand the evolving relationship between violence and state capacity in Latin America.