Two‐stage presale strategy under yield uncertainty: fresh product supply chain optimization with risk‐averse suppliers

Abstract This study examines the dynamic presale strategy of fresh agricultural products based on the risk to suppliers when involved in the planting risk of fresh agricultural products (shortage or overplanting). We use a two‐stage fresh produce supply chain system including single suppliers and retailers. Suppliers make decisions before planting and maturity, and retailers make decisions at the spot‐sale stage. Consumers are strategic and make decisions at the purchase stage based on their maximum utility. Suppliers reduce the uncertainty involved in planting risk through the preplanting and prematurity presale, whereas their risk‐averse behavior is modeled through the constant absolute risk‐aversion utility function. Retailers sell mature, fresh agricultural products and optimize their sales strategies according to market demand and supply conditions. This study analyzes the optimal decisions of supply chain members at each stage by establishing a multistage dynamic game model. The results reveal that the degree of risk aversion of suppliers and uncertainty of market demand significantly affect their planting decisions and two‐stage presale pricing. The numerical simulation shows that the higher the supplier's degree of risk avoidance, the lower the planting volume and the higher the price in the presale stage. Lower random output forces suppliers to reduce planting volumes and presale prices, reducing profits and increasing volatility in the overall supply chain. This study provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance for dynamic presale and spot‐sale decisions in fresh agricultural product supply chains.