The BWC at 50: Exploring OSINT Opportunities and Challenges in the BWC Ecosystem

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first international disarmament treaty to eliminate an entire class of weapons. As it celebrates its semicentennial, the BWC is recognized for enshrining norms against the misuse of biology, even during the height of the Cold War: norms that encapsulated humanity's repugnance of bioweapons. Nevertheless, the BWC faces unique challenges compared to other disarmament treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention. These include debates around verification, sociopolitical friction across the states parties, and even accusations that states parties have maintained biological weapons programs despite their treaty obligations. Many experts note difficulties in strengthening the BWC, particularly in a multipolar, competitive geopolitical environment. One potential pathway to support the BWC is using open-source information collection, analysis, and methods applied toward a "layered approach to verification [which] could help build confidence in compliance and potentially verify the BWC." Colloquially known as open-source intelligence (OSINT), this intelligence-gathering discipline uses publicly available information and signals sources for fact-checking, investigating suspicious occurrences, and examining items of interest. This approach has shown promise in other weapons of mass destruction applications, from tracking and tracing Syrian and Russian use of chemical weapons to uncovering nuclear weapons arsenals. Further, as stakeholders generate and retain more biological data from multisource samples, now is an opportune time to examine how open-source information and methods might mitigate bioweapons risks. This is particularly germane to the present, as people explore OSINT information and methods as 1 tool to both help strengthen the BWC architecture and support transparency and norm-setting efforts outside of the treaty.