Post-Neo-Kantian Idealism

In discussion with Kant, neo-Kantianism, and contemporary transcendental philosophy on the one hand and Hegel’s speculative idealism on the other, Krijnen discusses the philosophical form in which post neo-Kantian idealism has a future. First, he determines the type of Kantian transcendental idealism that constitutes its most advanced form. Here, Krijnen distinguishes intersubjectivity-theoretical forms of transcendental philosophy from phenomenology and neo-Kantianism and focusses on phenomenology and neo-Kantianism. In Krijnen’s analysis, a programmatic foundational deficit of phenomenology appears. In terms of a theory of principles, phenomenology falls behind Kant’s conception of philosophical foundations, whereas neo-Kantianism and the contemporary transcendental philosophers discussed continue the relevant programmatic line of Kant’s reasoning. Krijnen subsequently shows that even in its most advanced form, transcendental idealism suffers from formalism. This is due to the fact that transcendental philosophy misses the methodical moment of the ‘realization of the concept’ in the sense Hegel’s speculative idealism. For this reason, ‘form’ and ‘content’ remain opposed to each other externally. Hegel’s reproach of formalism does not state that Kant’s forms are merely empty shells, neglecting the content-logical character of principles in the sense of transcendental idealism. In contrast, Hegel’s reproach concerns a methodical problem that hinders transcendental idealism to actualize its own ambitions. Finally, Krijnen makes clear in what sense a Hegelian sublation of transcendental idealism into speculative idealism is of the essence for the future of post-neo-Kantian idealism.