Low-stakes accountability and public service turnarounds

Abstract Can accountability to external bodies induce performance turnaround in struggling public services? And if so, must account-holders use incentives and sanctions to change account-giving organizations that have hitherto failed to self-correct, or can a gentler, more informational regime suffice? Building on recent research into “low-stakes” accountability, we argue that feedback and standard-setting on their own may stimulate departmental turnarounds in complex, multiservice organizations by directing leaders’ scarce attention, control efforts, and resource allocations toward previously unnoticed performance deficits. However, given the potential for “tunnel vision” among account-givers, accountability-induced turnarounds may be confined to dimensions of performance most relevant to the account-holder, to the neglect of others. We test each stage of this theory using quasi-experimental methods and data from the Local Government Ombudsman in England. We show that councils that are notified of maladministration in their social care departments significantly increase leadership attention and control efforts toward this service, and invest more in its core staffing, compared with a matched sample of unnotified councils. On average, the rate of maladministration falls by more than half; though, as predicted, we detect no wider performance gains. The immediacy of the improvement further suggests that, after censure, care managers may be acting in anticipation of leaders’ increased attention.