The Mechanism of Green Transition of Energy Enterprises Applying Noncooperative–Cooperative Biform Game Model

From the interdisciplinary perspective of industrial economics and behavioral finance, this study establishes a noncooperative-cooperative biform game model between new energy enterprises and traditional energy enterprises. In this model, sales price is considered the non-cooperative strategy, while R&D expenses borne forms the basis of cooperative alliances. The Shapley value is applied to allocate profits, and numerical analysis is conducted to analyze the impact of factors, such as government subsidies and competitive intensity, on optimal strategies. The findings reveal the following: (1) Government subsidies effectively increase energy sales volume, promote technological advancements in new energy enterprises, and reduce the traditional energy enterprises’ proportion of R&D expenses borne. Moderate increases in competitive intensity are conducive to expanding market size, thereby enhancing both energy sales volume and profits. (2) Reasonably increasing the executive risk preference of energy enterprises encourages traditional energy enterprises to bear a higher proportion of R&D expenses and stimulates new energy enterprises to improve their production level, leading to increased sales value of energy. (3) Rising investment and production costs result in a higher proportion of R&D expenses borne for new energy enterprises. Consequently, the shrinking of new energy value reduces their profits, while the profits of traditional energy enterprises increase correspondingly.