Weaving Political Identities: Jean‐Luc Nancy, Empedocles, and (the Later) Plato

Since Anaxagoras offered us a homoeomeric view of substance, Empedocles a conception of a principled blending of elements, and the Plato of Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus a robust conception of blending (properties, syllables, and kinds), Western metaphysics has been perplexed by the problem of mixture: What can be combined? Does it maintain its essence when mixed? Is there a limit to the number of combinations? Can things of different kinds mix? Does the mixture form a unity? Does the notion of mixture challenge our idea of kinds, and indeed, objects, themselves? These questions become more complicated when one looks not at abstract objects but at actual cultures and persons. Jean-Luc Nancy has written extensively about “identity” in language and metaphysics, with perhaps the most focused study being his work titled “Identity and Trembling.” Addressing identity in the Hegelian system, Nancy explores the internal and external relations that constitute what is identified. He describes a number of operations (or functions) performed by what is identified on itself and that it performs on itself by means of itself. Differences constitute what is identified. What is identified, what identifies, that by means of which they are related, and how they are different from one another—these are all differents that constitute identity. What is identified makes a difference by introducing these differences into being. We might especially pay attention to the identity objects that are identical have, as well as their difference. This identity, which makes identical things identical, Nancy says, is “indifferent”: it is not different from anything. Only such an identity can make another identity “different” from another. All objects with an identity “have” this indifferent identity. Only something capable of actively relating to itself can be identical in this sense. Then it is capable, one might say, of being open to differences that are not merely aspects of itself (Nancy 1993: 9–11). In this creative interpretation of Hegel, Nancy learns that these formal aspects of identity and difference are inadequate for understanding singularity, plurality, or what he calls “being-singular-plural.” Such a sterile, formal notion of identity, as he understands it, excludes everything of importance to him. The matter of purification and mélange/mêlée is addressed in a less rigorous essay titled “Eulogy for the Mêlée” and later in his Identity. In these works, Nancy has offered a much celebrated ontology of “being-singular-plurality,” an effort to balance an emphasis on what one might call a radical singularity more basic than any identity, and a plurality that is not reducible to some quantitative multiple. It is a singularity without essential ingredients or necessary conditions, parts without either sum or whole, a changing plurality of relations and trajectories without identity: an “identity” that is not one, an identity that always frustrates and subverts expectations. Try as we might to conceive of identity as an internal relation (something is what it is because it coincides with itself, it returns to itself in a single move, A = A), there is no such coinciding, no return, only an open work of mixing or weaving together of something intimated or alluded to, but never properly named even if it has a proper name. Being-singular-plural, as it should be hyphenated, conjures the notion of both unity and division (Nancy 2000: 37). Nancy couches this in terms of the “each” of singularity, the uniqueness of singularization, and the irreducibility of plurality, often spoken of in terms of “spacing,” “exposure,” “sharing,” and “co-appearance.” Concerning singularity, there is a unique exteriority within each human being that makes the “human” itself. We might be shocked to learn that “a singularity is always a body, and all bodies are singularities (the bodies, their states, their movements, their transformations)” (Nancy 2000: 18). “Being-singular-plural” has no predetermined syntax that could help us to understand it, he insists. It carries a dual equivalence within it. If one might hazard to say that, if it can refer at all, it refers to both the “singularly plural” and the “plurally singular,” which in neither case even predicates Being at all (a claim that will have consequences later in this article) (Nancy 2000: 28–29). One fascinating issue at the core of this ontology is the nature of mixture. For Nancy, a conception of mixture should not leave everything in place. It should take care not to presuppose Being, but work with the singularizaton of “singularly plural” and the pluralization of the “plurally singular” (Nancy 2000: 56). It should not be conceived as a mixture of distinct, identifiable objects or properties. The initial state of these objects or properties prior to mixture should not be thought of as a quantitative multiple. Instead, we ought to of such mixture as and is by and as an in the of is a with and a notion of being of being or of of either that of the or in should work to the of any such in to the prior to to a of identity. as is the state of the work of of without being to some identity of a quantitative plurality of basic than Nancy is a with a conception of identity, and a to relations objects and properties are to the basic operations of and the of itself. there is a at the core of his his notion of Nancy into the of as not and as not the ontology with an to the of what is more than a interpretation of Empedocles be an to this What is even more is the in which the Plato of Sophist, Theaetetus, and a view of mixture in terms of a weaving that view of the is by the and for the in of the these to it and from it a identifiable by of its is to say, as it is it is both and to identity to any In a for an identity, is always and to (Nancy 2000: Nancy that this is there can be no identity. It be and indeed, even Nancy is not this is of the as well as the of that is identical only with itself is for this It not make its into Since the that the of the we might that this is only to and In this a or that its or itself as a of a is not only from but from itself. This means that when this and with this of of difference to is identified as a identity, a and identity, it from the identity it has in that of an identity within this of us to understand the nature of Nancy an from to the or one the identity of the by it. such is less than the it such of one are We be that a or not any such of in a The is when the something of or something more than what is more than the of the the of the the should a of things from and that within and as Nancy is a be a that such as which one a proper (Nancy 2000: What is most for our is to attention to the not the and the is a a of the is a an of that identity. The of is not to much or to it (Nancy 2000: Nancy the of from in the there is no effort to it. We should in terms of the of with its as a form of He is that is even indeed, that it should be The of is not some not any at It has no essence (Nancy 2000: We can only it a or in terms of some or of We are to understand that this is the even be of is a thought of something than the is that one can only conceive of in terms of the that make it without any being into Nancy to from to identity by it into the of He that is a form of a of and but and the is necessary in how things are he is often to a has the that the of have in It is that the has In there is always an emphasis on of is a and and as he it. The of and the of are the that the plurality of objects and properties in the In this there are as by there are and by (Nancy 2000: is a of to the work of and a work of to the work of to Nancy, and the work of to be some even in of and it that the of is to be for understanding the plurality of he another that of This of and of of to be that there can be but that are there is never any identity that is not that (Nancy 2000: that in this we might an of what the of to the of and we learn that there is but identity. In the of the division that identity is in terms of which in an emphasis on which is itself to the division that is identity. one of the of be to say the and not something even Nancy The of the of the of but it of plurality the of Such a conception has no and We are to the of the one it an effort to make the of in to and on the it that be to and in of this If “Eulogy for the Mêlée” is a work of the is much a work of the that It is a to the effort to the that there is a identity. In the of we might the problem of abstract identity. Nancy is that even the of identity that difference and such as and Hegel, to the of the of identity (Nancy For Nancy, what most of all is that, in the in the work of identity is always something what is identified, from its Nancy it as no that of and have to study the of of this notion with an internal the of to a or to a to a or to a Nancy to that identity has to be or or perhaps and (Nancy are always never because each is always being in and by changing into which one can never and which can never be on It is not merely a of something in a but something always (Nancy It might be to of the of their and and their is not the of identity. identity can be to itself, Nancy insists. all, merely an by which one into the One is into a of relations and It is in that a to is an and an such that, one one some of this the at more or less and and the of from one to the perhaps of another one, or or even (Nancy the nature of identity from can be in terms of a and a with the being and the being the which one identity in the the on by and the aspects of in which one no identity at Concerning the and of Nancy refers to an of in in which there is no but always a of each of which is neither an something from its of with any of each and each of the plurality of within it a of and in which is language and and the of and they Since is a of and and identity is as much to what is in the work of identity as a itself in the or a itself there is than a of the and of the we not be by the of in to say and what is of and in the as they are the of such (Nancy the is the from itself, itself. The of an that, any or to of of any of the which not at all the that will be by the of all but is a say in all that and how can say that (Nancy from an at a in an that is by a of all to a in that of One will identity, we be not to of this as an as in of it all, there is some identity in and by the one might that such a could be but not one might not be of the that one to make it. on things are For will not from to it is at it 2000: matter we of in terms of a plurality of the it from its conception of we not even of this as a the one that one is is the one that they are One of a plurality that is not one, one of which is at all 2000: Nancy this that only Being that only one single Being Nancy this as a and of itself. In there is no Being that or as a for the Only what Nancy says, and that is the itself, not any Since Nancy we have only the and as not the states, which only and with such a (Nancy 2000: In an effort to this Nancy has the of being. He has what has been the plurality of and into the and a of more terms into the as is even if the of a are and the and there is one that, in being in a of has a single identity. The being the is one if it is to be at Nancy not this within his For with we with with and with with and with 2000: is well Empedocles only from and what Empedocles the from these that is a single unity and that it is What Empedocles from this but its to a to in Empedocles us an Nancy only is there a being and but will their if only we not by on the of thought that makes fascinating and The of the in are for the merely of 2000: and one might make the case that all work or of at the that always in some even in such a is a problem that ought to be that to it has any that explores it. This us a to at the work that Nancy in to to Nancy to Is an emphasis on a of What and for could be as but are not the the and not have been to has its in which of together and For both are in our that have their blending to as they are for if they are not for if they are and It is that we are of at different to the but not to different things at the into the and in the is What is about is that things that are in this their to this are things from and things from 2000: In terms of their and are the that or For makes things and from one much in the that Nancy describes in the makes things one another even as it together 2000: there is a problem of to the of the but there is no to the Since we that there has been no in the from or and In it be that the but makes In it be that in or unity the of in which things are we say that there is but only this the or should be and are the of these elements, there to have been some even in the about which which 2000: and any and are each indeed, each is to be as a are the of all that and is and will be 2000: not their identity when but make what they are The by and are by in an 2000: Being the have their different in their different the in In these the one each the different 2000: has to the the and has the of the all these things together to be one, but from mixture of things to being which All which from 2000: We might that, in of a or in a we are in the are as they are they are as they are the It is things that are the in that are by In this and in its some things that by will named things in and by Empedocles not things by only that of things 2000: It is not to that each together a and a the and the for to what what is different and the for to what in the of these what is and and what it For each is and the of is in an that is of these and to this 2000: Being is Empedocles is that unity can form from plurality and into it the of of in his work our to his for it. What is for our is that Empedocles at it can be Nancy not even that it Empedocles explores the of a of unity and Nancy describes a state of one can only that any such It not merely or it. It is the that any such to work in without there being for to work on or work we might his to and as a of something about identity that Nancy such in to identity. He us not to identity in terms of any Nancy understand these as of the of and his when we understand these not any of the of The of and work for Empedocles because they presuppose an form and (the of matter for the at when is For Nancy, such can of these The of and the of identity Nancy In the of the of the of and for Nancy, Is this If what is the of to the of and If has been in the Nancy it that weaving and are terms Nancy to the of he has in the terms human or something to it. If that is an of to the of weaving in the later work of is a fascinating of especially as it in to the of and the of division and that are to it of of the importance of which he in for but which he to understand as an notion in and Sophist, and even a (or in Plato a notion of mixture in and in even it as a in in an of and by in Nancy and Plato are by what weaving Philebus Nancy all refer to Plato that weaving can be to the of Nancy weaving from any such an view of in and there is an the form of and the parts of either the or the parts of the parts of to one another as the parts of a and each to as a of the to the itself what has to be the unity of the that it is more to say that is as is homoeomeric is Plato by this view of the relation the form of and the but only is it to the of view of mixture in the is perhaps intimated in a a view of the different from He is by the kinds of for a that the radical and and the that and objects that are the in is from the in as to the of and are basic to an understanding of and These can be by a and an of which things together either in or in the of is but when the such that all that is in and are of itself Plato his conception of the of and as the is to an of We this most in Sophist, the identity of being is in terms of and the and A be and are with one each a being about which we can is at even is not at and is not itself there be some that both and as to how and can be by Plato that the we can say is that some things that can and can but not all these with of and that an with some to make it take an to understand these much as only a can understand the of For this is of which the to what can and what and makes blending as for this that with of could “a single form all a of each of which from the He that in and we have they are the or is from the and from the it is the as something and different than Plato often of the relation these kinds in terms of one being or one of the and are not the only which can be the or all kinds are the as they in or in the of the All kinds are different from one another because they all in the of the is different from but it is the as because they both in that which is different from the but all in the is the is the one and not the another. is the different one and not the different another. which both is which and which is what is and that which is the as itself and is the as that which is it is different from everything it is there is something about the in the notion of which in Sophist, we with what we might call the understanding of that is as the or of which the to He that and refer to to something than what is which is is the of which not its which is not is not merely in that by things as which is has its not has its nature as all, which is is not something that is but a that which is in itself is but as it in the of which is In it can that being and not even being in some but not in another. is neither which which is is a in which is all, how can we if it even be in terms of or that which is and that which is to Sophist, the is that we have only have we that we can conceive of which is but we can conceive of a in which which is because each of the nature of the different is which all, which is not of is it all of things that to about these of or in to each from everything This is in to the that such in a and In such we might language and that such is the of his to the of kinds and their what is even the of singularities into kinds such without such division to itself, which these is that which as it and there is a in Theaetetus, Plato a of and to the aspects of the of the he and In introducing the of to have a about and kinds, a that to in In this that the can only be can be about should be on to We even such terms as or even “each” to what they have of he that, as the can be can their be and become an of In only can be both and in and indeed, as objects of to something in this that the are and the He to the language with which this is and or the of of such that we to there is more to a than the that it or it is itself a Is it to the without its be a and the in the is no we ought not to have the to be the perhaps we ought to have it some single form of its single different from the the be a single form from the of the when they and this both of language and of things in a of or not there is a difference a and a returns to the matter of the If the can be as and as a whole, with its being the parts of that whole, we can say that both and are because the parts to be than the on the what if we of the as no and parts are both to have a one that is to the us that are more than or in that it is never the case that the is but the is is a of in which there is something about and they to be into It be to the into if the are It has the basic issue or a in with the any in we might Nancy is that, in neither are are and are to any of if are and be as substance, there can only be a mixing of something that is neither being not being. In Plato mixture as one of the For our what is most is how it and is by another. is well mixture is the for the blending of the and the of the of the and the properties of the especially Plato that it is which mixing things when to understand we with the but the with the to a plurality of of the of the is the of the of the and the This might us to about the of in it is to be to the of mixture can be in terms of the of which is an to the of any for the Plato of Statesman, the of mixture is addressed in terms of the of identity in an of and In which he describes in there is a of and One to form a which one into each one of which is and with the The matter of weaving is to as it not only but in and and in Statesman, the notion of weaving is of It is to itself. the proper the become it is for the to the of the by means of and It is the of the to understand the of that and the it a itself in in the language of Plato that when with a of and into a with only a nature that He that the will the and the if with a of and the of to one it together a and the of and the their together in and and makes it a We might that the of the is by an weaving in and which not only that there be that can be but that the of the that these is not merely something that such that its parts and It is something that can be indeed, What is is it is as it is is and it is is It is on of what there how it can and how it can for the as has weaving in is with and a in or by a more in a form of a a to from within its In the of the and are by weaving are both and This not the of plurality Nancy but which is at the of the of and the of in that not differences but to have the of differences into for the of all one might that is to be by this is to the nature of the means something a and an a of elements, and most not a a formal of weaving is a of different and into a without to a form of that In of and have of this If of formal identity is for and it be of some to with and even how are we to understand in relation to formal Does it it, which is because it not make a case that cultures and even in plurality, are from identifiable that they have and are we to understand that his merely and such a If his are at to and which are identified but have an and to it. One might notion of as merely one we might and this in itself that his view is merely a if one not a of It is by its the to of mixture. Plato a notion of weaving and what is which has in Nancy of language that their with in to formal identity. If Nancy the to identity as and or the might his effort to identity as or even weaving for the by means of The of relations Nancy might for that is in the or a that is by a to things into or even an of the of that is in For of as or as are an to relations that not only make identity but the weaving that makes the in a The has no of