Honesty, Deception, or Collusion? Quality Information Disclosure in Live Streaming Commerce

ABSTRACT This study employs a Stackelberg game‐theoretic framework to analyze three scenarios of product quality disclosure: honest disclosure of product quality to both consumers and influencers; deceptive disclosure of the actual quality to both influencers and consumers by brand manufacturers; and collusion between brand manufacturers and influencers in misleading consumers about the true quality. By modeling these scenarios using a multistage decision‐making game, equilibrium solutions for price, promotional effort, and penalties are derived. The findings indicate that low‐quality brand manufacturers encounter both “honesty” and “collusion” situations when marketing through single channels, whether self‐operated or via micro influencers. Mega influencers in hybrid channels can generate positive spillover effects that benefit self‐operated live streams more than low‐quality ones. When the power structure shifts, the operational strategy of truthfully disclosing product quality to consumers manifests a more distinct long‐term stability advantage. This study makes a significant contribution to the selection of market channels under conditions of information asymmetry, while also exploring strategies to enhance spillover effects through the adoption of hybrid channels.