The problem of doctrinal justification of legal sources in the context of the theory of legal argumentation, hermeneutics, and Ronald Dworkin's integrative jurisprudence

The article is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the doctrinal justification of sources of law in the context of key contemporary philosophical-legal approaches: the theory of legal argumentation, hermeneutics, and the integrative jurisprudence of R. Dworkin. The relevance of the study is determined by the necessity to overcome the limitations of traditional positivist understandings of sources of law, which reduce them to a closed system of formal acts. The central theme of the work is the revision of the concept of sources of law proposed by alternative methodologies. It explores how the theory of argumentation, rooted in analytical philosophy, justifies the transition from a rigid hierarchy of formal sources to a model of "open rationality," where any rational argument that has undergone procedural verification serves as the legitimate basis for a decision. In contrast, the hermeneutic approach (A. Kaufmann, U. Neumann) interprets sources of law as the embodiment of historically evolved legal experience, whose meaning is revealed not through formal procedures, but through the dialectical unity of text and interpretation. The research methods employed are characteristic of theoretical-legal and philosophical-legal analysis: the comparative legal method, used to identify similarities and differences between analytical and hermeneutic approaches; the method of conceptual reconstruction, used to systematize the views of key authors; and historical-philosophical analysis, which allows for tracing the genesis and transformation of fundamental ideas. The novelty of the research lies in the systematic identification and analysis of fundamental ontological and epistemological divergences between the theory of argumentation and hermeneutics concerning the doctrine of sources of law. It is argued that while the theory of argumentation, rooted in the analytical tradition, views sources of law as a resource for procedurally organized discussion within a procedural ontology, hermeneutics understands them as the embodiment of historical legal experience that requires deep meaningful comprehension. The work also reconsiders R. Dworkin's contribution through the lens of his polemics with the continental tradition (K. Larenz), which allows for the identification of common methodological issues related to the normative force of principles and the idea of "the one correct solution." Ultimately, it substantiates that contemporary theory of argumentation, through dialectical interaction with hermeneutics, contributes to the formation of a pluralistic and coherent model of sources of law, complementing the limitations of traditional paradigms.