Responsible Investors and Stock Market Feedback

ABSTRACT We examine how stock market feedback affects corporate investment when responsible investors are active in the market. These investors experience disutility when the firm’s investment decisions are misaligned with their nonfinancial preferences. A manager chooses between two projects that are ex ante financially equivalent: a “green” one aligned with investor preferences and a “brown” one that is not (e.g., due to environmental or social concerns). The success of the project depends on matching the investment with the state of nature. Because responsible investors prefer to hold green firms, trading is more informative when the firm signals green, strengthening market feedback. Anticipating this, the manager may misreport a brown signal as green to attract responsible investors. However, such manipulation can deter investors from acquiring information and reduce the firm’s value. We show that this mechanism is robust to several alternative investor compositions. JEL Classifications: G14; G30; M41.