Reconsidering the Relationship Between Sengzhao’s Things Do Not Shift and the Doctrine of Kṣaṇikavāda—With a Reassessment of Whether His Thought Reflects Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Doctrinal Affiliation

International scholars have frequently interpreted Sengzhao’s 僧肇 Things Do Not Shift (wubuqianlun 物不遷論, hereafter TDNS) as reflecting the doctrinal positions of the Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika schools. This paper argues that the core issue lies in the relationship between Sengzhao’s concept of “not shifting” and Kṣaṇikavāda (the theory of momentary arising and ceasing). A genealogical examination reveals that this interpretive view originated during the Tang dynasty—particularly in Chengguan’s 澄觀 citation of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (hereafter AKBh), which includes a dual-layered implication: both “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda (cha’na shengmie buqian 剎那生滅不遷)” and “not shifting based on śūnyatā (xingkong buqian 性空不遷)”. However, Chengguan did not make a conclusive judgment. This dual implication was already clearly distinguished by Yanshou 延壽 in the late Tang period. Yanshou pointed out that “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda” presupposes the real existence of dharmic entities, whereas Sengzhao’s view belongs to the Mahāyāna orientation of “not shifting based on śūnyatā”—thus marking a fundamental doctrinal distinction. In contrast, by the late Ming period, Zhencheng 镇澄 misinterpreted Chengguan’s argument out of context and reduced it to a heterodox doctrine of “not shifting based on the abide of inherent nature (xingzhu buqian 性住不遷)”. Later Ming masters such as Deqing 德清, Zhenjie 真界, and Huanyou 幻有 also emphasized the dual aspects in Chengguan’s explanation and directly refuted Zhencheng’s misreading. Therefore, the issue in equating Sengzhao’s TDNS with “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda” does not lie in the difference between “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda” and “not shifting based on śūnyatā” as this distinction was acknowledged on both sides. Rather, the key lies in identifying the doctrinal basis of Sengzhao’s argument: to which category does it properly belong? To answer this, the paper analyzes the conceptual structure of TDNS in contrast to the idea of “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda”, and finds a fundamental divergence in their understanding of whether phenomena are subject to arising and ceasing. Sengzhao’s notion of TDNS is not the same as the concept of “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda”. It will then analyze the differences between the two in their understandings of substance and time, revealing a fundamental divergence in their perspectives on whether phenomena undergo arising and cessation. Sengzhao’s concept in TDNS is not equivalent to the notion of “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda”, nor are they congruent in terms of the consequent conceptions of entities, time, and the view of temporal flow that emerge from these respective frameworks.