Structural integrity uncompromised: on behalf of the structural hylomorphist

Abstract One of the main targets of Material Objects in Confucian and Aristotelian Metaphysics is structural hylomorphism, a recent variant of hylomorphism espoused by authors such as Kit Fine, William Jaworski, and Kathrin Koslicki. Fr. Rooney raises at least three, and perhaps as many as five, different objections against structural hylomorphism in the book. My aim in this essay is twofold. First, I try to draw out some of the implicit premises and assumptions found within several of these objections in order to make them more perspicuous to those readers wishing to understand them better. Second, I offer a variety of replies on behalf of the structural hylomorphist to what I see as the three main objections against that sort of view. For each of the objections that I cover, I argue either that it raises no serious concerns for structural hylomorphism, or that there are ways that structural hylomorphists might navigate around these objections which Rooney has not considered, or that the main thrust of the objection targets Rooney’s preferred hylomorphic theory of material objects just as much as it targets structural hylomorphism.