Goals reconsidered: from brute prelusory states of affairs to the lusory complexity of sport

In this paper, I examine Bernard Suits’ conceptualization of goals in his influential definition of gameplay, focusing on how his account falls short of capturing the complexity of sporting practices. Suits famously describes games as voluntary attempts to overcome unnecessary obstacles in achieving an identifiable state of affairs. By referring to this state of affairs as the prelusory goal of games, he frames gameplay as structured teleologically around this goal, converting it into the most fundamental element of his notion of gameplay. Although elegant and very intuitive, this conception of games raises tensions when applied to the complex, multilayered activities commonly recognized as sports. In what follows, I examine those tensions to assess the suitability of Suits’ framework to theorize sport. I begin by analyzing Suits’ different notions of goals in gameplay and the role they play in this activity. I then show how the lusory complexity of sport—manifested in its plurality of goals, layered obstacles, and multiple player interactions—questions the aptness of Suits’ framework to grasp the nature of sport fully. Finally, I explore what philosophical work Suits’ definition is meant to do, arguing that its intended normative implications ultimately constrain its ability to account for the dynamic and often ambiguous goal structures that characterize many sporting activities. The paper concludes by advocating a qualified acceptance of using Suits’ definition to scrutinize the nature of sport.