Response to my fellow symposiasts

Abstract I respond to the criticisms of the other symposiasts in the IJPR symposium on my paper “Why a Christian God would permit so much suffering.” Strong positive arguments for the existence of a personal God (as normally understood in Christian thought) make it not too improbable that there is a sound theodicy. I argue that it is a great good for a human to be able to choose whether or not to become a saint, and show that horrendous evils give us the opportunity to make that choice. I put forward in my earlier paper, the view that God might ensure that everyone capable of doing so might have that choice in the afterlife, if they have not had that opportunity in this life and made then the good choice. But I now also endorse an earlier view of mine that it might be equally good if God imposed sanctity on those who, while living fairly good lives, have not had that choice in this life. So, while rejecting the major criticisms of the theodicy of my original symposium paper, I argue that both views provide satisfactory theodicies.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Published
2025-10-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-025-09970-4
Primary Topic
Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Response to my fellow symposiasts

Richard Swinburne
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Theology and Philosophy of Evil
article

Response to my fellow symposiasts

Richard Swinburne
article en

Abstract

Abstract I respond to the criticisms of the other symposiasts in the IJPR symposium on my paper “Why a Christian God would permit so much suffering.” Strong positive arguments for the existence of a personal God (as normally understood in Christian thought) make it not too improbable that there is a sound theodicy. I argue that it is a great good for a human to be able to choose whether or not to become a saint, and show that horrendous evils give us the opportunity to make that choice. I put forward in my earlier paper, the view that God might ensure that everyone capable of doing so might have that choice in the afterlife, if they have not had that opportunity in this life and made then the good choice. But I now also endorse an earlier view of mine that it might be equally good if God imposed sanctity on those who, while living fairly good lives, have not had that choice in this life. So, while rejecting the major criticisms of the theodicy of my original symposium paper, I argue that both views provide satisfactory theodicies.

International Journal for Philosophy of ReligionVol. 98(3)
University of Oxford (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 72%
Theology and Philosophy of Evil
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