The Unitary Executive Theory in Practice: <i>Bureaucratic Structure as an Obstacle to Executive Unilateralism</i>

This paper examines the viability of the controversial “unitary executive theory” (UET) in practice. Additionally, it explores the various ways by which scholars can publicly reason about the potential value of bureaucratic independence. This paper argues that, despite the genuine power that the president wields, bureaucracies remain extremely resilient to the kind of control the UET demands. In particular, the paper shows how bureaucracies are effectively path dependent organizations, the actions of which are constrained by their standard operation procedures, institutional interests, and workplace culture. Even so, because bureaucracies can still enter into equilibriums of power with aggressive executives, this paper argues that scholars must develop means of publicly reasoning about the value of independent bureaucracy that account for the unique aspects of American political culture.

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Publication Details

Journal
Political Research Quarterly
Published
2025-10-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129251389616
Primary Topic
European Union Policy and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

The Unitary Executive Theory in Practice: Bureaucratic Structure as an Obstacle to Executive Unilateralism

Joseph Karol Natali
Political Research Quarterly
European Union Policy and Governance
article

The Unitary Executive Theory in Practice: Bureaucratic Structure as an Obstacle to Executive Unilateralism

Joseph Karol Natali
article en

Abstract

This paper examines the viability of the controversial “unitary executive theory” (UET) in practice. Additionally, it explores the various ways by which scholars can publicly reason about the potential value of bureaucratic independence. This paper argues that, despite the genuine power that the president wields, bureaucracies remain extremely resilient to the kind of control the UET demands. In particular, the paper shows how bureaucracies are effectively path dependent organizations, the actions of which are constrained by their standard operation procedures, institutional interests, and workplace culture. Even so, because bureaucracies can still enter into equilibriums of power with aggressive executives, this paper argues that scholars must develop means of publicly reasoning about the value of independent bureaucracy that account for the unique aspects of American political culture.

Political Research QuarterlyVol. 79(1)
Baylor University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 66%
European Union Policy and Governance
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