The Inescapability of Law and the Duty of the Rule of Recognition

Abstract H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism identifies the rule of recognition as the foundational concept grounding a legal system, emphasizing its basis in social practice rather than moral evaluation. Hart argues for a strict conceptual separation between law and morality, allowing the rule of recognition to neutrally establish criteria for legal validity. Nevertheless, debate surrounds whether this rule inherently creates obligations for legal officials. While some scholars, such as Julie Dickson, argue it merely confers powers without imposing duties, others, notably Jules Coleman and Neil MacCormick, insist it necessarily entails obligations – specifically the duty to adhere exclusively to the recognized criteria when identifying valid laws. This obligation arises from officials committed internal acceptance of the rule, ensuring the system’s normative coherence and stability. Thus, despite controversy over its precise characterization, Hart’s conception ultimately presents the rule of recognition as a fundamentally duty-creating social practice essential for any developed legal system.