Revenue Distribution in Manufacturer–University Collaborative R&D for Industrial Generic Technologies

The collaborative model between manufacturers and universities represents a primary mechanism for achieving deep cross-organizational synergy in the development of industrial generic technologies. Establishing a scientific and equitable benefit-distribution mechanism is crucial for building efficient and sustainable collaborative partnerships between these heterogeneous entities. With manufacturers as the principal incentive provider, this study incorporates the heterogeneity of both parties and develops dynamic game-theoretic models under both decentralized and centralized decision-making modes to investigate the optimal profit-sharing mechanism and its underlying operational logic. The findings indicate that when both the manufacturer’s and the university’s efforts contribute to the outcome, profit sharing is essential regardless of the decision-making modes to incentivize cooperation. Moreover, the profit distribution coefficient is determined solely by each party’s relative contribution weight. In the presence of bilateral moral hazard, manufacturers attain higher profits under decentralized decision-making compared to the centralized mode, leading to a preference for decentralized schemes. Universities, conversely, exhibit the opposite preference. Nevertheless, the decentralized decision-making mode is found to maximize the overall benefits for industrial generic technology collaboration. Theoretically, this research extends the framework of cooperative innovation and benefit distribution into contexts involving heterogeneous actors and multiple decision-making regimes, offering a novel dynamic game-based perspective for cross-organizational collaborative governance. Practically, it provides actionable insights for mechanism design in manufacturer–university partnerships, contributing significantly to improving the efficiency and sustainability of such collaborations.