Truthlikeness and progress in naturalistic metaphysics

How does scientifically informed metaphysics make progress? One idea is that metaphysics based on science makes progress on the back of science. If science makes progress, then so too does the metaphysics based on that science. Some argue that there is a problem with this line of reasoning. Kerry McKenzie claims that naturalistic metaphysics cannot make progress, even in principle, because metaphysical theories cannot approximate the truth as science can. In this paper, I offer a response to the worry McKenzie raises. I claim that metaphysics is capable of making progress given an alternative account of scientific progress to hers, the truthlikeness account of progress. I argue that metaphysical theories, in principle, can increase in truthlikeness. According to the truthlikeness account of progress, if theories in a discipline increase in truthlikeness, then the discipline makes progress. Finally, I address two responses to an additional concern that those sharing McKenzie’s perspective might have. In doing so, I sketch the groundwork for an alternative account of progress, one that leverages the tool-building approach to metaphysics that others have defended.