The Law of Racial Profiling

Racial profiling is one of the most enduring problems in policing. Yet it remains largely under-theorized, which generates important theoretical and practical implications. Racial profiling tends to be construed as an arbitrary detention rather than a form of unconstitutional discrimination. For this reason, the section 15 Charter right to equality plays little to no role in most leading cases on racial profiling. The legal framework that governs racial profiling lacks clarity and can be applied inconsistently. And the remedial landscape associated with racial profiling claims has evolved minimally. This article advances a novel approach to racial profiling that addresses these shortfalls. It demonstrates why racial profiling is wrongful primarily because it embodies discrimination that violates the section 15 Charter right to equality, and secondarily, infringes liberty or privacy interests, and in so doing, breaches other constitutional rights. It offers a simplified legal framework for how courts can better approach racial profiling in constitutional criminal procedure. Drawing on the republican theory of freedom (or republicanism), it shows why racial profiling results in domination—meaning vulnerability to unchecked threats of interference— that courts fail to control. In doing so, it deepens our theoretical understanding of racial profiling and its connection to equality and liberty. The concluding parts of this article contend that courts can incorporate two innovative remedies that can better prevent and address racial profiling: structural injunctions and constitutional settlement agreements. Ultimately, this article offers a new path forward for how racial profiling can be approached in a manner that better safeguards individuals’ fundamental rights and interests.