Research on the Evolutionary Stability of Strategy Selection for Forest Ecological Benefit Compensation Standards

ABSTRACT Forest ecological benefit compensation mechanisms are critical for aligning private landowner incentives with forest ecosystem service objectives. However, traditional area‐based schemes in China neglect the additionality of the ecosystem services and fail to capture dynamic strategic interactions between policymakers and forest managers. To address this gap, this study develops a two‐player evolutionary game model, in which the government chooses between equalization and compensation incentive compensation, whereas forest farmers decide whether to conserve. The model then analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy selection of the game players and explores the impacts of different parameter changes on the evolutionary stable strategy. The results show that the evolutionary stable states of the strategy selection of both parties in the game exhibit complexity due to different initial states. Increases in compensation fees, forest farmers' production revenue, and silvicultural capacity, as well as reductions in forest farmers' risk aversion coefficient, fairness preference coefficient, government free‐riding coefficient, and information asymmetry coefficient, will promote the evolution of the system to the optimal stable equilibrium point. Notably, the forest farmers' conservation effort level under incentive compensation on system evolution presents a significant “inverted U‐shaped” feature. This research provides a new analytical perspective and scientific basis for the optimal design of the forest ecological benefit compensation mechanism.