Restive Regions: Sequential Complementarity of Repression and Cooptation in Authoritarian Survival

Under what conditions can repression, generally assumed to induce obedience through violence, consolidate authoritarian power in a non‐violent way? I propose a novel theory of the effects of repression, accounting for regional heterogeneity of state capacity. Failed centralization efforts during state‐building processes lead to the emergence of strong local power structures, fostering persistent resistance against autocratic cooptation strategies. Repression in such “restive” regions has downstream effects that complement autocrats’ cooptation policies by increasing the state’s extractive and informational capacities. To test these predictions, I leverage a legal change resulted in the replacement of pro‐Kurdish mayors with government‐appointed trustees in Turkey’s restive regions. Adopting two‐way‐fixed‐effects models, I demonstrate evidence supporting my theory. This article provides an alternative view about how repression generates favorable outcomes for autocrats.